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Abstract
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which inter-
actions between group members correspond to the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game.
Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals compete with peer group members based
on individual payoff, while groups also compete with other groups based on average payoff of group
members. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this creates a tension between the two levels of selection,
as defectors are favored at the individual level, whereas groups with at least some cooperators
outperform groups of defectors at the between-group level. In the limit of infinite group size and
infinite number of groups, we derive a non-local PDE that describes the probability distribution of
group compositions in the population. For special families of payoff matrices, we characterize the
long-time behavior of solutions of our equation, finding a threshold intensity of between-group selec-
tion required to sustain density steady-states and the survival of cooperation. When all-cooperator
groups are most fit, the average and most abundant group compositions at steady-state range from
featuring all-defector groups when individual-level selection dominates to featuring all-cooperator
groups when group-level selection dominates. When the most fit groups have a mix of cooperators
and defectors, then the average and most abundant group compositions always feature a smaller
fraction of cooperators than required for the optimal mix, even in the limit where group-level se-
lection is infinitely stronger than individual-level selection. In such cases, the conflict between the
two levels of selection cannot be decoupled, and cooperation cannot be sustained at all in the case
where between-group competition favors an even mix of cooperators and defectors.
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1 Introduction
Across many complex biological systems, ecological and evolutionary dynamics can best be understood
by considering forces of competition and selection acting at multiple organizational levels. Competition
at multiple levels is a driving force for the evolution of virulence, where pathogen strains which replicate
quickly within-host can outcompete rival strains, but are also more likely to kill the host, preventing
further transmission of the strain [1–3]. The balance of these two dynamics has been theoretically
demonstrated to select for the evolution of strains with intermediate virulence, and has been posited as
an explanation for the diminished virulence of myxomatosis in rabbit populations in Australia [4, 5].
Multilevel selection is also considered to be a factor in prebiotic evolution and the evolution of
multicellularity [6–11]. In an attempt to answer the question “Which came first, the protein or the nu-
cleic acid?”[12], Eigen used the quasispecies equation to show that competition of self-replicating genes
leads to the ultimate dominance of a single type, implying the inability of quasispecies competition to
generate genomes of greater biological complexity [12, 13]. To overcome this hurdle, Szathmary and
Demeter introduced the “stochastic corrector” model, which places component elements into separated
vesicles which are themselves capable of self-replication [6]. Considering two constituent self-replicating
quasispecies, Szathmary and Demeter show that the coupling of selection within vesicles and between
vesicles allow for the coexistence of competing quasispecies that cannot coexist in the absence of vesicle
structure [6].
These hierarchical biological phenomena can often be viewed in the framework of game theory,
where a population of individuals is subdivided into groups, and the strategic behavior of individuals
has effects both on competition for resources or reproduction between individuals in the same group and
in higher-level competition where groups compete with other groups based on their respective strategic
compositions. These ideas have been explored in simulation studies for the evolution of protocells and
the origins of life [7, 14]. Similar phenomena have been observed in field and laboratory research on
the ant species Pogonomyrmex californicus [15], whose colonies can be founded by multiple unrelated
queens, and where characteristics such as density of ant hills can serve as a mechanism for mediating
the individual advantage for aggressive, solitary ant queens and the greater capacity for cooperative
queens to establish shared ant hills.
Models of multilevel selection have been studied in the population genetics literature, starting
with the Kimura equation with deme-level selection events [16], which uses a diffusion expansion to
predict the fixation probabilities of two alleles, one which dominates in within-group competition, while
the other type dominates in between-group selection. Ogura and Shimakura then studied the Kimura
equation, characterizing invariant families of solutions and demonstrating convergence to steady-state
distributions of alleles [17, 18]. Fontanari and Serva further generalize the Kimura model to allow
for nonlinear group-level reproduction functions to describe the evolution of protocells, and show that
group reproduction functions that favor coexistence of an even mix of cooperators and defectors can
result in steady-states with groups of coexisting cooperators and defectors [19–21].
In the context of evolutionary games, Traulsen and Nowak introduced a model of multilevel
selection in finite populations, in which within-group selection follows the frequency-dependent Moran
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process and groups can also undergo fission when they reach a maximum size [22, 23]. A similar
approach was followed by Böttcher and Nagler, who explored the frequency-independent donation
game and added the possibility of group-level extinction events that depend on average group payoff
[24]. In both models, the authors derive conditions to favor the fixation of a single cooperator in a
resident population of defectors relative to the fixation of a single defector in a resident population
of cooperators. For games in which within-group or between-group selection favors coexistence of
cooperation and defection, it becomes important to study the dynamics for the full distribution of
group compositions, as fixation is not necessarily the predicted long-time behavior.
In this spirit, Luo introduced a stochastic ball-and-urn process model for multilevel selection
with birth and death events for both individuals and groups [25]. In this model, the population is
subdivided into groups; and agents can be of one of two types: those with an advantage at the within-
group level of selection (type-I) and those who contribute to success at the between-group level of
selection (type-G). Selection in this model is frequency-independent, as type-G individuals reproduce
at rate 1 and type-I individuals reproduce at faster rate 1 + s, regardless of the composition of their
group. Groups reproduce at rates proportional to their fraction of type-G individuals, so the two levels
of selection act in direct opposition.In the limit of a large number of groups and large group size, Luo
obtains deterministic population dynamics governed by a non-local (or integro-) PDE
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
x−
∫ 1
0
yf(t, y)dy
]
(1.1)
where f(t, x) is the probability density for a group with a fraction x of type-I individuals at time t and
λ governs the relative intensities of selection at the two levels. The Luo model was extended by van
Veelen et al to explore this multilevel selection model in the context of the debate between kin selection
and group selection [26]. Luo and Mattingly rigorously proved the weak convergence of the ball-and-
urn process to a measure-valued PDE in the deterministic limit as M,N → ∞ and characterize the
long-time behavior of Equation 1.1 based on the initial distribution of groups in the population and
the relative selection strength λ [27]. McLoone et al also study a similar two-level Moran process for a
special case of the Hawk-Dove game, showing in simulations that multilevel selection produces higher
levels of cooperation than the traditional well-mixed model [28]. Similar models were introduced by
Simon et al, which include more heterogeneity in group size and a broader variety of group-level events
such as group fission, fusion, and extinction [29–33]. Numerical analysis has shown that group fission
and extinction effects can facilitate the emergence of cooperation [32].
Notably, the Luo model was, in part, designed as a minimal model illustrating the direct compe-
tition between two-forces of selection: within-group selection that favors defectors, and between-group
selection which favors groups with many cooperators [25]. In evolutionary games, one or both of in-
dividual payoff and average group payoff can either facilitate the dominance of one type or promote
coexistence. At the individual level, Prisoner’s Dilemma games promote the dominance of defection,
whereas Hawk-Dove games promote coexistence between cooperators and defectors. At the between
group level, both Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Hawk-Dove games can either exhibit maximal group fit-
ness for all cooperator groups or provide maximal benefit to groups with an intermediate fraction of
cooperators and defectors. An interesting question to ask is whether generating individual and group
level selection from payoffs of an evolutionary game produces different qualitative behaviors than the
frequency-independent Luo model.
The question of achieving maximal average payoff in a group has been recently studied in the-
oretical and empirical contexts. One mechanism by which group payoff can decrease for high levels
of cooperation is subadditivity of payoffs, a characteristic feature of nonlinear public goods game, in
3
which the amount of public good produced can either be a step-function [34, 35] or a smoothed Fermi
function [36] of the fraction of cooperators. Maclean et al explore experimentally the population fitness
in yeast groups composed of individuals of a “cooperator” type, which pays a metabolic cost to produce
a protein invertase which decomposes complex carbohydrates, and a “cheater” type which consumes
decomposed sugars but freerides on the efforts of the cooperators. They show that, under certain
conditions, population fitness is maximized by groups which have a combination of cooperators and
cheaters [37]. Boza and Számadó also consider optimal provision of public goods in a simulation of
multilevel selection in animal groups. They show that such selection favors convergence to the optimal
fraction of cooperators, and refer to the defectors that help to achieve this optimal cooperation as
“beneficial laggards” [38].
Here, we extend Luo’s ball-and-urn model to allow selection at both the within-group and
between-group levels to depend on payoffs from a two-player cooperative dilemma. By formulat-
ing between-group selection as dependent on the average payoff of group members, we allow for the
misalignment of individual and group interests to emerge from the payoff matrices of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Hawk-Dove game. We then derive a limiting PDE description of this multilevel
selection process, which can be understood as coupling the replicator dynamics for within-group se-
lection and a “group-level replicator dynamics” that characterizes birth and death events at the group
level. We then study the steady-states of our multilevel PDE for both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Hawk-Dove game, and we determine the most abundant group composition at steady-state.
We characterize the relative levels of between-group and within-group selection strength at which
cooperation can coexist with defection, and show that whether the limit of weak within-group selec-
tion produces steady-states whose most abundant groups have the highest average payoff depends on
whether group average payoff is maximized at full cooperation or if group average payoff achieves
its optimum with an intermediate fraction of cooperators. In Section 2, we define our evolutionary
game and two-level Moran process and use them to derive a limiting PDE. In Section 3, we focus on
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, proving long-time behavior for a special family of payoff matrices, and then
studying the steady-states for more general PD games. In Section 4, we perform a similar analysis for
the Hawk-Dove game. We postpone some detailed calculations and present them in the Appendix.
2 Derivation of Differential Equations
In this paper, we extend the framework of Luo and Mattingly to discuss multilevel selection where
the underlying individual and group-level reproductive fitness is generated by two-player evolutionary
games. We consider games with two strategies: cooperation (C) and defection (D). Our population
consists of M groups with N individuals per group. Individuals obtain reproductive fitness by playing
the following symmetric two-strategy game against the other N − 1 members of its group
C D( )
C R S
D T P
(2.1)
where R is the reward for mutual cooperation, T is the temptation to defect against a cooperator, P
is the punishment for mutual defection, and S is the sucker payoff for cooperating with a defector.
We define a Prisoner’s Dilemma as a game with the payoff rankings T > R > P > S, whereas the
Hawk-Dove (or Snowdrift) game is defined by T > R > S > P [39]. Because payoff will determine
birth rates for individuals and groups, we assume for convenience that R,S, T, P ≥ 0.
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In a group with i cooperators, a cooperator and defector receive average payoffs from interactions of
FCi =
1
N − 1 [(i− 1)R+ (N − i)S] (2.2)
FDi =
1
N − 1 [iT + (N − i− 1)P ] (2.3)
Then the average payoff of all members of an i-cooperator group is
Gi =
iFCi + (N − i)FDi
N
=
i [S + T − 2P ]
N − 1 +
i2 [R− S − T + P ]
N(N − 1) +
N2P
N(N − 1) +
i(P −R)−NP
N(N − 1)
(2.4)
Denoting x = iN , we see that Gx= iN → G(x) = (S + T − 2P )x+ (R − S − T + P )x
2 + P as N →∞.
Within-group dynamics follow a continuous-time Moran process. Individuals of type X in a group
with i cooperators are chosen to give birth at rate 1 + wIFXi , where wI is the strength of selection at
the within-group or individual level. The offspring replace a randomly chosen individual in the same
group, including possibly its parent.
Denoting by fi(t) the fraction of groups with i cooperators, we see that fi(t) increases by 1M due to
within-group competition if one of two events happens
• A new cooperator replaces a defector in a group with i− 1 cooperators, which happens with rate
Mfi−1(t)(i− 1)
(
1 + wFCi−1
) (
1− i−1N
)
• A new defector replaces a cooperator in a group with i+ 1 cooperators, which happens with rate
Mfi+1(t)(N − (i+ 1))
(
1 + wFDi+1
) (
i+1
N
)
Similarly, fi(t) decreases by 1M due to within-group competition when
• A new cooperator replaces a defector in a group with i cooperators, which happens with rate
Mfi(t)(i)
(
1 + wFCi
) (
1− iN
)
• A new defector replaces a cooperator in a group with i cooperators, which happens with rate
Mfi(t)(N − i)
(
1 + wFDi
) (
i
N
)
and within-group events in which a cooperator replaces a cooperator or a defector replaces a defector
leave fi(t) unchanged.
The dynamics of between-group competition follow a process analogous to a continuous-type Moran
process. A group with i cooperators is chosen to produce a copy of itself at rate Λ (1 + wGGi), where
wG represents the selection strength at the between-group level and Λ modulates the relative rate of
within-group and between-group replication events. The offspring group replaces a randomly chosen
group in the population.
The fraction of i cooperator groups fi(t) increases by 1M in the between-group dynamics when a group
of i cooperators is selected to reproduce and a group with a different number of cooperators is selected
to die. This occurs with rate ΛMfi(t) (1 + wGi) (1 − fi(t)). The between-group dynamics result in a
decrease of 1M for fi(t) when a group with i cooperations is chosen to die and a group of different size
is selected to replace it, which occurs with rate ΛMfi(t)
(∑
j 6=i fj(t) (1 + wGj)
)
.
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Now we follow the heuristic derivation of Luo [25] and of Van Veelen et al [26], obtaining limiting
ODE and PDE descriptions of our multilevel system by first taking the limit as the number of groups
M → ∞, and then taking the limit as group size N → ∞. As an aside, we note that first taking the
limit of group size N → ∞ would yield a system of M ODEs for evolutionary game dynamics in M
infinitely large subpopulations, such as studied by Young and Belmonte [40]. Luo and Mattingly also
show that the multilevel process weakly converges to a deterministic measure-valued process and, in
a different scaling limit, can weakly converge to a martingale-valued process known as a Fleming-Viot
process[27, 41] . A similar rigorous derivation is given by Puhalskii et al for for Simon’s multilevel
model with group-level fission and extinction events [33].
The infinitesimal mean for this continuous-time stochastic process is given by
M∆t := E [fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t)] = 1
M
[
P
(
fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t) = 1
M
)
− P
(
fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t) = −1
M
)]
=
1
M
(
Mfi−1(t)(i− 1)
(
1 + wIF
C
i−1
)(
1− i− 1
N
))
∆t
+
1
M
(
Mfi+1(t)(N − (i+ 1))
(
1 + wIF
D
i+1
)( i+ 1
N
))
∆t
− 1
M
(
Mfi(t)(i)
(
1 + wIF
C
i
)(
1− i
N
))
∆t
− 1
M
(
Mfi+1(t)(N − (i+ 1))
(
1 + wIF
D
i+1
)( i+ 1
N
))
∆t
+
1
M
ΛMfi(t) (1 + wGGi) (1− fi(t))− ΛMfi(t)
∑
j 6=i
fj(t) (1 + wGGj)
∆t
We can rearrange this to say that
E [fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t)]
∆t
=
1
N
D2
(
fi(t)
i
N
(
1− i
N
))
+ ΛwGfi(t)
Gi − N∑
j=0
Gjfj(t)

+ wI
[
D+1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FDi
)
−D−1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FCi
)]
where D2(·), D+1 (·) and D−1 (·) are second-order, first-order forward, and first-order backward difference
quotients given by the formulas
D+1
(
u
(
i
N
))
:=
u( i+1N )− u( iN )
1
N
, D−1
(
u( iN )
)
:=
u( iN )− u( i−1N )
1
N
D2
(
u( iN )
)
:=
u( i+1N )− 2u( iN ) + u( i−1N )
1
N2
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Dividing both sides by wI , taking the limit ∆t→ 0, and rescaling time as τ = twI , we have
dE[fi(t)]
dτ
=
1
N
D2
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)
)
+ λfi(t)
Gi − N∑
j=0
Gjfj(t)

+D+1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FDi
)
−D−1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FCi
)
where we have introduced the parameter λ := ΛwGwI to jointly measure the relative rate of between-group
and within-group selection events (Λ) and the relative strengths of within-group (wI) and between-
group (wG) selection. By similar calculations, we see that the infinitesimal variance of fi(t) is
V∆t := E
[
(fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t))2
]
=
1
M2
P
(
fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t) = 1
M
)
+
1
M2
P
(
fi(t+ ∆t)− fi(t) = −1
M
)
=
1
M2
[O(M)]→ 0 as M →∞
As demonstrated by Luo [25], the vanishing infinitesimal variance in the large M limit tells us that
fi(t) evolves deterministically and takes on the constant value E[fi(t)]. In this limit, our multilevel
system takes on the deterministic description given by the system of ODEs
dfi(t)
dt
=
1
N
D2
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)
)
+ λfi(t)
Gi − N∑
j=0
Gjfj(t)

+
[
D+1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FDi
)
−D−1
(
fi(t)
i
N
(1− i
N
)FCi
)]
From the ODE limit, we take the limit as group membership N →∞ to obtain the limiting PDE
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
[x(1− x) ((P − S)− (R− S − T + P )x) f(t, x)] (2.5)
+ λf(t, x)
[
(S + T − 2P )
(
x−
∫ 1
0
yf(t, y)dy
)
+ (R− S − T + P )
(
x2 −
∫ 1
0
y2f(t, y)dy
)]
where f(t, x) denotes the probability density of groups with composition of fraction x cooperators
and 1− x defectors. We note that the term with 2nd-order difference quotient 1ND2
(
fi(t)
i
N (1− iN )
)
vanishes when N →∞, so their is no diffusive effect in the PDE limit as their is in the ODE limit with
infinite M and finite N . We note that this is a consequence of the scaling of M and N , which allows
us to compare deterministic effects of within-group and between-group competition, although others
have explored multilevel selection in limits that preserve a diffusion term [17–21] or in the stochastic
Fleming-Viot limit [27, 41, 42].
2.1 Interpretation of PDE
Going forward, we will write this more compactly by denoting α = R − S − T + P , β = S − P ,
γ = S + T − 2P , and Mfj =
∫ 1
0 y
jf(t, y)dy, the moments of f(t, x), to give us
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
γx+ αx2 −
(
γMf1 + αM
f
2
)]
(2.6)
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which corresponds to the dynamics of our multilevel system with interactions corresponding to a payoff
matrix of the form
C D( )
C γ + α+ P −β + P
D γ − β + P P (2.7)
We choose to retain the punishment payoff P from the original payoff matrix of Equation 2.1 and to
express the payoffs R, S, and T in terms of P , α, β, and γ because P directly shows up in the function
for average group payoff G(x) = P + γx+ αx2. Under suitable rescaling of time, we can normalize P
to an aribitrary non-negative value. Further, because the multilevel dynamics given by Equation 2.6
depend on the payoff matrix through α, β, and γ, we can understand the role of the payoff matrix
through the relative values of these three parameters.
The term α = R− S − T +P is called the “gains from switching” and determines whether the average
group payoffG(x) is concave or convex, and can be positive, negative, or zero for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and is always negative for the Hawk-Dove game. The term β = S−P characterizes whether it is worse
to be a cooperator or defector when interacting with a defector, characterizing the main difference
between the interactions of the Hawk-Dove game (β > 0) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (β < 0). The
parameter γ = S + T − 2P tells us whether the total payoff for an interaction between a cooperator
and a defector exceeds the total payoff of an interaction between two defectors. It is always positive
for the Hawk-Dove game, and can be negative, positive, or zero for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Example 2.1. Consider a frequency-dependent Prisoners’ Dilemma with the following payoff matrix
C D( )
C b− c −c
D b 0
(2.8)
which has the interpretation that cooperators pay a cost c to confer a benefit b to their coplayer, while
defectors pay no cost and confer no benefit to their coplayer. This game is also called the donation
game and is a two-player version of a linear public goods game [? ] and was mentioned as an example
application for Luo’s multilevel framework [25]. For this game, the multilevel dynamics are given by
the equation
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= c
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)f(t, x)] + λ(b− c)f(t, x)
[
x−Mf1
]
(2.9)
which is a rescaled version of Luo and Mattingly’s multilevel equation [25, 27].
Example 2.2. A standard class of Hawk-Doves games, dating back to the ideas of Maynard Smith and
Price, is characterized by the family of payoff matrices of the form
C D C V2 0
D V
V − C
2
(2.10)
[43? , 44]. Here, a resource of value V is to be divided beteween two individuals who can either
cooperate (“doves”) or defect (“hawks”). A pair of doves split the resource in half and each receive V2 ,
while an interaction between a hawk and a dove results in the full resource V for the hawk and nothing
8
for the dove. When a pair of hawks meet, they fight over the resource, and in expectation receive half of
the resource but also pay a cost C2 to fight, obtaining a total payoff of
V−C
2 . It is assumed that C > V ,
so that the expected outcome for a fight between hawks is worse that the outcome for a dove that allows
a hawk to take the full resource. For this family of payoff matrices, the multilevel dynamics are given
by the equation
2
C
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
[
x(1− x)
(
C − V
C
− x
)
f(t, x)
]
+ λf(t, x)
[
2x− x2 −
(
2Mf1 − 2Mf2
)]
(2.11)
where within-group dynamics push for coexistence of C−VC cooperators and
V
C defectors and where
between-group dynamics are most favorable to all-cooperator groups.
For general two-player, two-strategy games, the PDE for our multilevel system given by Equation 2.6
is a first-order equation with characteristic curves given by the replicator dynamics
x˙(t) = x(1− x) (β + αx) (2.12)
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the replicator dynamics has a stable equilibrium at 0 and an unstable
equilibrium at 1, while for the Hawk-Dove game, there are unstable equilibria at 0 and 1 and a stable
interior equilibrium at
xeqint = −
β
α
=
S − P
S − P + T −R ∈ (0, 1)
.
The advection term − [x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)]x corresponds to the within-group population dynamics
due to births and deaths of individuals. In the absence of group selection (λ = 0), equation 2.6 reduces
to ft(t, x) = [x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)]x, which can be seen as an Eulerian version of the replicator
dynamics for a metapopulation without between-group interactions [45]. In this case, given density
initial data f(0, x) = f0(x), f(t, x) converges to a delta-distribution at the stable equilibrium at t→∞.
The nonlocal term λf(t, x)[(γx + αx2) − (γMf1 + αMf2 )] describes the dynamics due to group-level
extinction and replication events,and can be interpreted as a version of the replicator dynamics for
between-group competition. In the absence of within-group selection, the population dynamics can be
rewritten as ft(t, x) = λf(t, x)[(γx + αx2) − (γMf1 + αMf2 )], a function-valued ODE reminiscent of
the replicator dynamics for continuous-strategy games studied by Bomze, Oechssler and Riedel, and
others [46–48]. In this framework, the typical long-time behavior is concentration of f(t, x) upon a
delta-distribution at the maximizer of average group payoff G(x) in [0, 1].
The combination of the advection and nonlocal terms in Equation 2.6 characterizes the conflict between
the tendency of within-group competition to favor defection and the tendency of between-group com-
petition to favor groups with a majority of cooperators. In particular, we are interested in exploring the
balance between these effects for varying levels of the relative rate of within-group and between-group
birth and death events, Λ, as well as the relative strengths of selection at the two levels, wI and wG.
2.2 Properties of PDE
Because we derive the PDE of the multilevel system from a ball-and-urn process, it important to check
that the limiting differential equation preserves normalization of the probability density over population
states. Assuming that
∫ 1
0 f(t, x)dx = 1 at a given time t, integrating both sides of Equation 2.6 with
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respect to x from 0 to 1 yields
∂
∂t
[∫ 1
0
f(t, x)dx
]
=
∫ 1
0
{
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
γx+ αx2 −
(
γMf1 + αM
f
2
)]}
dx
= x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)
∣∣∣∣1
0
+ λ
[(
γMf1 −Mf2
)
−
(
γMf1 −Mf2
)∫ 1
0
f(t, x)dx
]
= 0
and we can deduce that
∫ 1
0 f(t, x)dx =
∫ 1
0 f(0, x)dx for all t ≥ 0. In other words, if f(0, x) is normalized,
then solutions f(t, x) of equation 2.6 remain normalized at all later times t.
To study the behavior of Equation 2.6, it helps to introduce the associated PDE
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x) [γx+ αx2 − h(t)] (2.13)
where h(t) is a general function of time. In analogy with Lemma 6 of Luo and Mattingly [27], we
see that the only function h(t) for which solutions of Equation 2.13 remain normalized is h(t) =
γMf1 (t) + αM
f
2 (t). Using the method of characteristics, we obtain the representation formula for
solutions of Equation 2.13
f(t, x) = f0(x0(t, x)) exp
[
βt+
∫ 1
0
{
(λγ − 2(α+ β))x(s) + (λ+ 3)αx(s)2} ds− ∫ 1
0
h(s)ds
]
(2.14)
where x0 := x0(t, x) can be found by solving the replicator dynamics backwards in time. From this
representation formula, we see that non-negativity of the initial distribution f(0, x) = f0(x) on [0, 1]
implies non-negativity of f(t, x) on [0, 1] at subsequent times t for which our solution in Equation 2.14
exists.
Next we can use a contraction-mapping argument analogous to that of Dawidowicz and Loskot for
nonlocal transport equations on spatial domain [0,∞) [49] to demonstrate that local existence of
solutions to Equation 2.13 implies local existence to solutions of Equation 2.6. By denoting f0(t, x) the
solution of 2.14, we can construct a subsequent f1(t, x) as a solution via the method of characteristics to
Equation 2.13 with h(t) chosen as h(t) = γ
∫ 1
0 yf
0(t, y)dy+α
∫ 1
0 y
2f0(t, y)dy. Extending this scheme, we
can make use of the Banach fixed point theorem to guarantee that fn(t, x)→ f(t, x) as n→∞, where
f(t, x) is the unique non-negative solution to Equation 2.6. Then, using our representation formula
with h(s) = γMf1 (s) + αM
f
2 (s) and observing that β − 2(α + β)x(s) + 3αx(s)2 ≤ |β|+2|α + β|+3|α|,
γ(x(s) −Mf1 (s)) ≤ |γ| and α(x(s)2 −Mf2 (s)) ≤ |α|, we can estimate that solutions of Equation 2.6
with bounded and density-valued initial data satisfy
f(t, x) ≤
(
sup
x0∈[0,1]
f0(x0)
)
exp [{(5 + λ)|α|+3|β|+λ|γ|} t] <∞ (2.15)
for x ∈ [0, 1] and for all finite t, so our solutions obtained via the method of characteristics exist and
remain density-valued for finite times t.
2.2.1 Weak, Measure-Valued Formulation
In the absence of between-group competition, the expected behavior of Equation 2.6 is for all of the
probability to accumulate as a delta-function near the stable steady-state of the within-group replicator
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dynamics. We formalize this intuition by considering a weak, measure-valued formulation of our PDE,
and use this to prove some of our main results on the time-dependent behavior of the multilevel system.
Multiplying both sides of Equation 2.6 by test function ψ(x) ∈ C1[0, 1] and integrating, we get
d
dt
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)f(t, x)dx =
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)
{
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
γx+ αx2 −
(
γMf1 + αM
f
2
)]}
dx
Integrating the first term by parts, we have that
d
dt
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)f(t, x)dx = −
∫ 1
0
{
∂ψ(x)
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)] + λψ(x)
[
γx+ αx2 −
(
γMf1 + αM
f
2
)]}
f(t, x)dx
For the cumulative distribution function F (t, x) corresponding to the density f(t, x), we note that
f(t, x)dx = Fx(t, x)dx = dF (t, x). In the sense of a Stietjes integral, we can then write
d
dt
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)dF (t, x) = −
∫ 1
0
{
∂ψ(x)
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)] + λψ(x) [γx+ αx2 − (γMF1 + αMF2 )]}dF (t, x)
Denoting the probability measure associated with f(t, x) and F (t, x) by µt(dx), we have the equation
d
dt
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx) =
∫ 1
0
{
−∂ψ(x)
∂x
[x(1− x)(β + αx)] + λψ(x) [γx+ αx2 − (γMµ1 + αMµ2 )]}µt(dx)
(2.16)
where we have denoted the jth moments of the probability distribution byMfj , M
F
j , andM
µ
j to match
the description of the probability distribution in terms of its descriptions in terms of a density f(t, x),
cumulative distribution function F (t, x) or measure µt(dx).
We say that the flow of measures {µt(dx)}t∈[0,T ] is a weak solution of 2.16 with given initial data µ(dx)
if for every test function ψ(x) ∈ C1([0, 1]), 〈ψ, µt(dx)〉 is differentiable in time, satisfies Equation 2.16
for all t ∈ [0, T ], and fulfills the initial condition µ0(dx) = µ(dx).
Remark 2.1. With this measure-valued formulation, we can see that the measures δ(x), δ(x− 1), and
δ(x− βα), the delta-functions at the steady-states for within-group dynamics, are also steady-states for
Equation 2.16. For the first term, we note that x(1− x)(β + αx) vanishes at these points, and for the
second term, with any measure µt(dx) = δ(x− a) (with corresponding Mf1 = a and Mf2 = a2) satisfies∫ 1
0
ψ(x)
[
γx+ αx2 −
(
γMf1 + αM
f
2
)]
µt(dx) = ψ(a)
[(
γa+ αa2
)− (γMf1 + αMf2 )] = 0
We can break down the dynamics of our multilevel system into changes caused by within-group com-
petition and those caused by between-group events. Individual-level competition within a single group
is governed by the replicator dynamics given by Equation 2.12, whose solution given time t and initial-
condition x0 we call φt(x0) := x(t, x0). We can describe the effect of within-group competition in the
group-structured population using the push-forward measure of the initial distribution µ0(dx) under
the dynamics φt(x) [27, 50] using the following equivalent notation
Ptµ0(dx) = φt#µ0(dx) =
[
µ0 ◦ φ−1t
]
(dx)
We can illustrate the effects of within-group dynamics by testing the push-forward measure against
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the function ψ(x), which yields∫ 1
0
ψ(x)Ptµ0(dx) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)
[
µ0 ◦ φ−1t
]
(dx) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(φt(x))µ0(dx)
In particular, this representation tells us how the probability distribution evolves as µt(dx) = Ptµ0(dx)
in the case where λ = 0 in Equation 2.16, when the multilevel system is governed by within-group
competition alone.
We can also describe the effect of between-group competition using the formula below
wt(x) = exp
(
λ
∫ t
0
[(
γx(s, x0) + αx(s, x0)
2
)− (γMµ1 + αMµ2 )]ds) (2.17)
Combining the effects of within-group and between-group competition, we can represent the evolution
of the probability distribution using the implicit formula
µt(dx) = wt(x)Ptµ0(dx) = exp
(
λ
∫ t
0
[(
γx(s, x0) + αx(s, x0)
2
)− (γMµ1 + αMµ2 )]ds)Ptµ0(dx)
(2.18)
where we note that this is an implicit description because the moments Mµ1 and M
µ
2 depend on the
distribution µt(dx). In future work, we will address the existence and uniqueness of measure-valued
solutions µt(dx) to Equation 2.16 given initial distribution µ0(dx) = µ(dx), and we justify the use of
this representation formula to describe the evolution of µt(dx). Given this formula, we can describe
the behavior of our multilevel system by testing ψ(x) against µt(dx) as follows∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)wt(x)Ptµ0(dx) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(x)wt(x)
[
µ0 ◦ φ−1t
]
(dx) =
∫ 1
0
ψ(φt(x))wt(φt(x))µ0(dx)
(2.19)
2.2.2 Possible Group-Level Reproduction Functions
An important factor for the long-time behavior of Equation 2.6 is where the group-level reproduction
rate G(x) = γx + αx2 is maximized. If x∗ = argmaxx∈[0,1] (G(x)) = 1, then all-cooperator groups
are most favored at the between-group level, and would be selected to dominate the population in
the absence of within-group selection. If x∗ ∈ (0, 1), then between-group selection instead most favors
groups with proportions of x∗ cooperators and 1−x∗ defectors, and acts to promote coexistence between
cooperators and defectors in the long-run.
For the Hawk-Dove game, γ = (S − P ) + (T − P ) > 0 and α = (T −R) + (S − P ) < 0. Because G(x)
has a local maximum at x∗ = − γ2α when G′(x) = γ + 2α = 0 , we see from γ > 0 and α < 0 that
x∗ =
{
− γ
2α
: γ < −2α
1 : γ ≥ −2α
=⇒ x∗ =

S + T − 2P
2(−R+ S + T − P ) : 2R < T + S
1 : 2R ≥ T + S
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we can’t make a similar definitive statement about the signs of γ and α.
Instead, we consider two special cases in which γ > 0 and either α = −1 or α = 0. In these two special
cases, we see that the group fitness function G(x) has the following behavior
Case I: For γ > 0 and α = −1, then G(x) = γx− x2 and we have a similar situation to the Hawk-Dove
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game, where x∗ =
{
−γ
2
: γ < 2
1 : γ ≥ 2
.
Case II: If γ > 0 and α = 0, we have G(x) = γx and recover a scaled version of the Luo-Mattingly model
governed by Equation 1.1. For this case, we have x∗ = 1, ∀γ > 0.
Having explored the value of x∗ for the Hawk-Dove games and the Prisoner’s Dilemmas we consider
in this paper, we will see in subsequent sections that whether x∗ = 1 or x∗ ∈ (0, 1) will determine a
change in qualitative behavior in the limit when λ = wGwI Λ → ∞. Notably, this is the limit in which
wI  wG, selection strength in between-group competition is weak relative to selection strength for
within-group competition.
3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this section, we consider the multilevel dynamics when strategic interactions consist of Prisoner’s
Dilemma games. In Section 3.1, we consider a special family of payoff matrices for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma for which the replicator dynamics are analytically solvable. With solvable replicator dynamics,
we use the method of characteristics to study the long-time behavior of our multilevel system, as used
for the frequency-independent case by Luo and Mattingly [27]. In Section 3.2, we characterize the
steady-states for our multilevel PDE and explore the behavior of steady-states in the limit of large λ.
3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma with Solvable Replicator Dynamics
If we consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma with T = R+ 2, P = S+ 1, then we have that α = −1 and β = 1,
and our payoff matrix corresponds to a Case I PD. This family of payoff matrices takes the form
C D( )
C γ + P − 1 P − 1
D γ + P + 1 P
(3.1)
where γ > 1 guarantees that the corresponding game is actually a PD (so that R > P or γ+P−1 > P ).
We note that, in this case, G(x) = γx − x2, which is maximized at x∗ = min(γ2 , 1) ∈ (12 , 1] for γ > 1.
In other words, group payoff is maximized by groups with a majority of cooperators for γ > 1 and is
maximized by all-cooperator groups for γ ≥ 2. Cooperators and defectors become perfect complements
for average group payoff G(x) = x(1−x), when γ = 1 and the game is no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The replicator dynamics for this game is
dx(t)
dt
= −x(1− x)(1 + x)
which can be solved forwards in time for x(t) given initial condition x0 and t as
x(t, x0) = φt(x0) =
x0√
(1− x0)2e2t + x20
(3.2)
We note that limt→∞ x(t) = 0, so the characteristics converge to the Nash equilibrium for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We can also solve the replicator dynamics backwards in time for x0(x, t) given current t and
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x(t) with
x0(t, x(t)) = φ
−1
t (x) =
x√
(1− x2)e−2t + x2 (3.3)
Because the replicator dynamics are exactly solvable for payoff matrices of this form, we can use the
method of characteristics in the manner employed by Luo [25] and Luo and Mattingly [27] to explore
the long-time behavior of solutions to Equation 2.6. For such payoff matrices, we have the simpler
PDE
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
[x(1− x)(1 + x)f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[(
γx− x2)− (γMf1 −Mf2 )] (3.4)
The contributions to the solution due solely to between-group competition are given by
wt(x) := exp
(
λ
(
γ
∫ t
0
x(s, x0)ds−
∫ t
0
x(s, x0)
2ds−
∫ t
0
h(s)ds
))
As shown in the appendix, we can use the forward and backward solutions of the replicator dynamics
to compute that∫ t
0
x(s, x0)ds = t+
1
2
log
(
1− x
1 + x
)
+
1
2
log
(
e−2t +
2x2 + 2x
√
e−2t (1− x2) + x2
(1− x)(1 + x)
)
(3.5)∫ t
0
x(s, x0)
2ds = t− 1
2
log
(
e−2t(1− x2) + x2) (3.6)
and using the values of these integrals we see that
wt(x) =
(
1− x
1 + x
)λγ
2
(
e−2t +
2x2 + 2x
√
e−2t (1− x2) + x2
(1− x)(1 + x)
)λγ
2 (
e−2t(1− x2) + x2)−λ2 eλ(γ−1)t−∫ 10 h(s)ds
We can isolate the component of wt(x) that depends only on time by writing wt(x) = gt(x)eλ(γ−1)t−
∫ 1
0 h(s)ds,
where
gt(x) =
(
1− x
1 + x
)λγ
2
(
e−2t +
2x2 + 2x
√
e−2t (1− x2) + x2
(1− x)(1 + x)
)λγ
2 (
e−2t(1− x2) + x2)−λ2 (3.7)
To describe the long-time behavior of our multilevel system, it will help to use the approach of Luo
and Mattingly [27] and characterize the behavior of the tail of our initial distribution using the Hölder
exponent near x = 1, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. The Hölder exponent of our measure µt[0, x], near the endpoint x = 1 is given by
θt = inf
{
Θ ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ ∃C > 0 s.t. limx→0 µ0[1− x, 1]xΘ = C
}
Example 3.1. A family of densities with Hölder exponent θ is given by f(x) = θ(1 − x)θ−1. For
θ = 1, we recover the uniform density f(x) = 1. For θ < 1, the density of groups blows up near full
cooperation (x = 1), while for θ > 1, the density tends to 0 near full cooperation.
Intuitively, we can think of the Hölder exponent near x = 1 as describing how strongly or weakly the
probability distribution is concentrated near all-cooperator groups. We see that larger θ corresponds to
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weaker concentration of probablity near all-cooperator groups, so stronger between-group selection is
required in order to sustain groups with many cooperators. We will see in the propositions below that
the ability for multilevel selection to maintain cooperation in the population is tied to competition
between relative strengths λ of between-group and within-group selection and the concentration of
near-all-cooperator groups θ. This phenomenon is seen in the frequency-independent model of Luo
and Mattingly [27], and has been shown as important for emergence of cooperation in simulations of
the game theoretic models of protocell evolution by Markvoort et al [14].
Now we characterize the long-time behavior of our multilevel system. To develop intuition for the role
of the Hölder exponent of the initial distribution, we can solve our multilevel system for our family of
initial densities of the form θ(1− x)θ−1 for θ > 0 from Example 3.1.
Example 3.2. For the family of payoff matrices under consideration, for which α = −1 and β = 1,
we find from Equation 2.14 that solutions of the multilevel dynamics satisfy
f(t, x) = f0(x0(t, x)) exp
[
t+
∫ t
0
{
λγx(s)− (λ+ 3)αx(s)2} ds− ∫ 1
0
h(s)ds
]
(3.8)
We can use Equation 3.3 to see that the initial distribution is pushed forward by within-group dynamics
as follows
f0(x0(t, x)) = f0
 1√(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1
 = θ
1− 1√(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1
θ−1
= θ
(
e−2t(1− x2) + x2
e−2t(1− x2) + x2 −
x
√
e−2t(1− x2) + x2
e−2t(1− x2) + x2
)θ−1
= θe2(1−θ)t
((
1− x2)+ e2t (x2 − x√e−2t (1− x2) + x2))θ−1 (e−2t(1− x2) + x2)1−θ
Combining this with the expressions for
∫ t
0 x(s)ds and
∫ t
0 x(s)
2ds given by Equations 3.5 and 3.6, using
the expression gt(x) from Equation 3.7, and recalling that solutions to Equation 3.4 are normalized, we
see that our solution is given by
f(t, x) = θZ−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]tgt(x)
((
1− x2)+ e2t (x2 − x√e−2t (1− x2) + x2))θ−1 (e−2t(1− x2) + x2)1−θ
(3.9)
where Zf is a normalizing constant (so that
∫ 1
0 f(t, y)dy = 1). Heuristically, we see that if λ(γ − 1) >
2θ, then f(t, x) → Z−1f xλ(γ−1)−2θ−1(1 − x)θ−1(1 + x)−λγ+θ−1. However, if λ(γ − 1) < 2θ, then the
exp ([λ(γ − 1)− 2θ] t) term will cause the decay of probability density for x ∈ (0, 1), and, as we will soon
see, f(t, x) ⇀ δ(x) (groups concentrate at the all-defector within-group equilibrium of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma). We also note that one can use Definition 3.1 to verify that the Hölder exponent is preserved
in time for solutions of Equation 3.4 for the given family of initial data, as shown in Appendix C.
Now we are ready to characterize the long-time behavior of the multilevel PD system. The qualitative
behavior is divided into two regimes by a critical level of relative strength of between-group selection
(λ∗ := 2θγ−1) which depends on the payoff matrix through γ and on the initial data through the Hölder
exponent θ near x = 1. For λ < λ∗, the distribution of groups converge to a delta-function at full-
defection (δ(x)) as t→∞. When λ > λ∗, the distribution of groups converges to a density supported
at all group types as t → ∞, so groups with any mix of cooperators and defectors are sustained at
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steady-state. We note that the payoff of all-cooperator groups is G(1) = γ − 1 and that the condition
required for the survival of cooperation is λ(γ − 1) = λG(1) > 2θ. This means that the ability to
sustain cooperation in our multilevel selection model requires a sufficiently capable combination of
between-group selection strength λ and payoff for all-cooperator groups G(1) relative to the extent
to which the initial distribution fails to concentrate near all-cooperator groups θ. This is reflective
of the inevitable decrease of cooperators within groups due to individual birth and death events, and
that the main opportunity to delay the within-group march towards defection is the reproduction of
all-cooperator groups.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose our initial population distribution has Hölder exponent θ near x = 1. If
λ(γ − 1) < 2θ, then µt(dx) ⇀ δ(x) as t→∞.
Here, “⇀” denotes weak convergence of the probability measures {µt(dx)}t≥0 as t → ∞ to a limit
µ∞(dx), or that for any test function ψ(x) ∈ C1[0, 1],
∫ 1
0 ψ(x)µt(dx)→
∫ 1
0 ψ(x)µ∞(dx) as t→∞.
Proof. We will show that, for any continuous function ψ(x),
∫ 1
0 ψ(x)µt(dx)→ ψ(0) as t→∞. Because
ψ(·) is continuous, we know that ∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that |φ(x) − φ(0)|<  when x ∈ [0, δ]. Because
µt(dx) is a probability distribution, we can say that∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ(0)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ δ
0
|ψ(x)− ψ(0)|µt(dx) +
∫ 1
δ
|ψ(x)− ψ(0)|µt(dx)
< + 2||ψ||∞
∫ 1
φ−1t (δ)
wt(φt(y))µ0(dy)
We rewrite
gt(x) =
(
1− x
1 + x
e−2t +
2x2 + 2x
√
e−2t (1− x2) + x2
(1 + x)2
)λγ
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤7(λγ)/2
(
e−2t(1− x2) + x2)−λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤δλ for x∈[δ,1]
and so ∃M > 0 such that ∀x ∈ [φ−1t (y), 1], gt(φt(y)) ≤M and wt(φt(y)) ≤Meλ(γ−1)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds.
Further, for h(s) = γMµ1 (s)−Mµ2 (s), we note that γ > 1 for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and thatMµ2 ≤Mµ1
because x2 ≤ x on supp(µt(dx)) ⊂ [0, 1].Thus h(s) ≥Mf1 (s)−Mf2 (s) > 0, so e−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)ds ≤ 1 for t ≥ 0,
and therefore wt(φt(y)) ≤Meλ(γ−1)t for each t ≥ 0 and for each x ∈ [φ−1t (δ), 1]. Therefore∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ(0)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ + 2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−1)t ∫ 1
φ−1t (δ)
µ0(dx) = + 2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−1)tµ0[φ−1t (δ), 1]
Using φ−1t (x) =
((
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1)−1/2 ∈ [0, 1], we see that
φ−1t (x) ≥
1(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1 = 1−
(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1 ≥ 1−
(
1
x2
− 1
)
e−2t because x ∈ [0, 1]
Now, for x ∈ [δ, 1] and ∀t ≥ 0, we see that ∃D > 0 such that φ−1t (x) ≥ 1−Dd−2t, so µ0[φ−1t (x), 1] ≤
µ0[1−De−2t, 1]. Using the assumption that limx→0 x−θµ0[1− x, 1] = C for some constant C ∈]0,∞[,
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we can deduce that µ0[1−De−2t, 1] ≤ CD
(
e−2t
)θ. Then, because λ(γ − 1) < 2θ, we have that∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ(0)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ + 2MCD||ψ||∞e[λ(γ−1)−2θ]t <  as t→∞
and therefore
∫ 1
0 ψ(x)µt(dx)→ ψ(0) at t→∞. 
Proposition 3.2. If λ(γ − 1) > 2θ, then µt(dx) ⇀ µθ∞(dx) = Z−1f xλ(γ−1)−2θ−1(1 − x)θ−1(1 +
x)−
λγ
2
+θ−1dx, where Zf is a normalizing constant such that
∫ 1
0 µ
θ∞(dx) = 1.
Sample steady-states for given initial distributions and various values of λ and θ are given in Figure 1
for γ = 2.5 and in Figure 2 for γ = 1.5. In Figure 1, we see that steady-state densities feature more
cooperators as λ increases, and that less relative selection strength λ is required to sustain cooperation
for initial conditions with θ = 1 (left) than for initial conditions with θ = 2 (right). In Figure 2, we
see that groups with optimal average payoff cannot be sustained in large quantity at steady-state even
for large relative between-group selection strength.
Figure 1: Steady state densities for various relative selection strengths λ when γ = 2.5 (G(x) maximized by
x = 1), computed from the result of Proposition 3.2. (Left) Steady state corresponding to initial distribution
with Hölder exponent θ0 = 1 near x = 1. (Right) Steady state corresponding to initial distribution with Hölder
exponent θ0 = 1 near x = 1.
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Figure 2: Steady state densities for various relative selection strengths λ when γ = 1.5 (G(x) maximized by
x = 0.75), computed from the result of Proposition 3.2. (Left) Steady state corresponding to initial distribution
with Hölder exponent θ0 = 1 near x = 1. (Right) Steady state corresponding to initial distribution with Hölder
exponent θ0 = 1 near x = 1. Dotted line indicates that average group payoff G(x) is maximized at 75 percent
cooperators.
Proof. For λ(γ−1) > 2θ, we show, for any ψ ∈ C([0, 1]), that there is a family of normalizing constants
{Zt}t≥0 such that Zt
∫ 1
0 (ψgt)◦ (φt(x))dµ0(x)→
∫ 1
0 ψ(x)fθ(x)dx. First we integrate by parts, obtaining∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt](x)dµ0(x) = ψgtF0(1−)− ψgtF0(0+)−
∫ 1
0
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)F0(x)dx
where F0(x) := µ0[0, x] is the cumulative distribution function of µ0. Because φt(x) is continuous and
satisfies φt(0) = 0 and φt(1) = 1, we know that
∫ 1
0 ∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)dx = [ψgt](1−) − [ψgt](0+). This
allows us to rewrite our above equation as∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt](x)dµ0(x) = [ψgt(1− F0)](1−)− [ψgt(1− F0](0+) +
∫ 1
0
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)(1− F0(x))dx
Because the group compositions are supported on [0, 1], 1 − F0(1−) = 0, and we have from Equation
3.7 that gt(0+) = e−λ(γ−1). This allows us to see that
[ψgt(1− F0)](0+) = ψ(0)gt(0)(1− F0(0+)) = (1− F0(0+))ψ(0)e−λ(γ−1)t]
Picking Zt = e2θt, we see that
lim
t→∞ e
2θt
(
ψgt(1− F0))(0+)
)
= lim
t→∞
(
(1− F0(0+))ψ(0)e−(λ(γ−1)−2θ)t
)
→ 0 when λ(γ − 1) > 2θ
For the integral term, we write y = φt(x) and see that ∂x [ψ(y)gt(y)] = ∂y[ψ(y)gt(y)]·∂xy, so integrating
with respect to y gives∫ 1
0
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)(1− F0(x))dx =
∫ 1
0
∂y [ψ(y)gt(y)] (1− F0(φ−1t (y))dy
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Because gt(x)→ xλ(γ−1)(1 + x)−λγ as t→∞, we see that
lim
t→∞ ∂x [(ψgt) ◦ x] = ∂x
[
xλ(γ−1)(1 + x)−λγψ(x)
]
We also observe that
1− F0(φ−1t (x)) = µ0[φ−1t (x), 1] = µ0[1− (1− φ−1t (x)), 1]
= µ0
[
1−
(
1− x2) e−2t + x2 − x√(1− x2) e−2t + x2
(1− x2) e−2t + x2 , 1
]
Then, using our assumption on µ0[1− x, 1] for x near 1 to deduce that for large t,
1− F0(φ−1t (x)) ≈ Ce−2θt
(1− x2)+ e2t
(
x2 − x√(1− x2) e−2t + x2)
(1− x2) e−2t + x2
θ
We can also compute that lim
t→∞ e
2θt
[
1− F0(φ−1t (x))
]→ C2−θ ((1− x)(1 + x))θ x−2θ, and
e2θt
∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)]µ0(dx)→ C
2θ
∫ 1
0
∂x
[
xλ(γ−1)(1 + x)−λγψ(x)
]((1− x)(1 + x)
x2
)θ
dx
as t→∞. We can then integrate the righthand side by parts to see that
e2θt
∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)]µ0(dx)→ 2C
2θ−1
∫ 1
0
xλ(γ−1)−2θ−1(1− x)θ−1(1 + x)−λγ+θ−1ψ(x)dx 
Remark 3.1. In the case where λ(γ − 1) > 2θ, we can use Definition 3.1 to see that the steady-state
density fθ(x) also has Hölder exponent of θ near x = 1. Because our steady-states are densities, we
see that the associated steady-state measure µλ∞([0, x]) satisfies µ∞([1− y, 1]) =
∫ 1
1−y fθ(x)dx, and can
find the Hölder exponent from the calculation
lim
y→0
y−α
∫ 1
1−y
fθ(x)dx = lim
y→0
y−α
∫ 1
1−y
Z−1f x
λ(γ−1)−2θ−1 (1− x)θ−1 (1 + x)−λγ+θ−1 dx
= lim
y→0
(1− y)λ(γ−1)−2θ−1(y)θ−1 (2− y)−λγ+θ−1
Zfαyα−1
=
2−λγ+θ−1
αZf
lim
y→0
yθ−α
Then we see that
lim
y→0
y−αµλ∞([1− y, 1]) =

0 : α < θ
(αZf )
−1 2−λγ+θ−1 : α = θ
∞ : α > θ
which allows us to conclude that the Hölder exponent of the steady-state fθ(x) is θ0, and therefore the
long-time Hölder exponent θ∞ = θ0, i.e. the Hölder exponent of the steady-state distribution
∫ x
0 fθ(x)dx
agrees with the Hölder exponent θ0 of the initial data µ0[0, x]. Combined with the intuition provided
in Example 3.2, we further conjecture that the Hölder exponent is conserved in time by the multilevel
system given by Equation 2.6. The discrepancy between the potentially nonzero Hölder exponent for
finite times in Example 3.2 and the Hölder exponent of 0 the weak-limit distribution δ(x) is reminscent
of the discrepancy between conserved energy and the energy of weak-limit solutions for solutions of
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the Becker-Döring equations with supercritical initial density [51]. We demonstrate the preservation of
Hölder exponents for the explicit solutions from Equation 3.9 with our specially chosen initial data in
Appendix C.
3.2 Steady States for Prisoner’s Dilemma
We can find the possibly steady-state densities for the multilevel Prisoner’s Dilemma system by char-
acterizing time-independent solutions of Equation 3.4. We seek to solve the equation
0 =
∂
∂x
(x(1− x)(1 + x)f(x)) + λf(x)
[
γx− x2 − γMf1 + 2Mf2
]
(3.10)
Density solutions to Equation 3.10 are steady-states of the form
f(x) = Z−1f x
λ
(
γMf1−Mf2
)
−1
(1− x)(λ/2)
(
γ−1−(γMf1−Mf2 )
)
−1
(1 + x)
−1+(λ./2)
(
1+γ+(γMf1−Mf2 )
)
As a matter of self-consistency, the steady-state distribution has to be integrable (and, in fact, normal-
ized). We note that the integral of f(x) will blow up near x = 1 unless the exponent of 1− x exceeds
−1. This occurs when
λ
2
(
γ − 1−
(
γMf1 −Mf2
))
> 0 =⇒ G(1) >
∫ 1
0
G(x)f(x)dx
where we recall that G(1) = γ − 1 and that ∫ 10 G(x)f(x)dx = γMf1 −Mf2 . Therefore it is impossible
to have a density steady-state for this family of Prisoner’s Dilemmas for which the average payoff of
the population exceeds the average payoff of a all-cooperator group. We can parametrize these steady-
states by their Hölder coefficent near x = 1, which we can compute using Definition 3.1. Definition 3.1
tell us that the Hölder exponent of our steady-state density fλθ (x) near the endpoint x = 1 is equal to
θ =
1
2
[
λ(γ − 1)− λ(γMf1 −Mf2 )
]
. (3.11)
We can also rearrange this to express the average payoff in the whole population (
∫ 1
0 G(x)f(x)dx =
γMf1 −Mf2 ) in terms of the Hölder exponent θ, for given λ and θ, as follows∫ 1
0
G(x)f(x)dx = γMf1 −Mf2 = γ − 1−
2θ
λ
(3.12)
Rewriting our steady-states in terms of θ, we have
fλθ (x) = Z
−1
f x
λ(γ−1)−2θ−1 (1− x)θ−1 (1 + x)−λγ+θ−1 (3.13)
We notice that the solution of the time-independent problem of Equation 3.10 given by Equation 3.13
with given Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 coincides with the density from Proposition 3.2 achieved as
the long-time behavior of Equation 3.4 for initial data with corresponding Hölder exponent θ.
So far, we have classified the long-time behavior of our system when λ(γ − 1) < 2θ, in which case
we converge to full defection, and when λ(γ − 1) > 2θ, showing that we get coexistence of many
compositions of cooperators and defectors within groups. Now we can study how this coexistence
between coperation and defection fares in the limit as λ → ∞, when between-group competition
is infinitely stronger than within-group selection. Denoting the steady-state which attracts initial
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distributions with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 for given λ (satisfying λ(γ − 1) > 2θ), we have that
fλθ (x) = Z
−1
f x
λ(γ−1)−2θ−1(1− x)θ−1(1 + x)−λγ2 +θ−1 (3.14)
One way of quantifying our steady-state fθλ(x) is to describe the most abudant (or modal) group type
at steady-state xˆθλ := argsupx∈[0,1] f
λ
θ (x). In the following proposition, we characterize the behavior of
xˆθλ for various λ, and show that the behavior of xˆ
θ
λ depends on whether average group payoff G(x) is
maximized by all-cooperator groups (x∗ = 1, when γ ≥ 2) or by type of group with a mix of cooperators
and defectors (x∗ ∈ (0, 1), when γ < 2).
Proposition 3.3. Suppose θ ≥ 1. If 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2, lim
λ→∞
xˆλ(f
λ
θ ) = γ − 1. If γ > 2, lim
λ→∞
xˆλ(f
λ
θ ) = 1.
Proof. We start by differentiating fλθ and see that
dfλθ (x)
dx
= g(x)
[
Z−1f x
λ((γ−1)−2θ)−2 (1− x)θ−2 (1 + x)−λγ+θ−2
]
where g(x) is given by g(x) = λ(γ − 1)− 2θ− 1 + (−λγ)x+ (3 + λ)x2. We note that g(x) vanishes at
the points
xλ± =
λγ +
√
(λγ)2 − 4 (λ(γ − 1)− 2θ − 1) (3 + λ)
2(3 + λ)
(3.15)
In the limit of large λ, that this simplifies to
x∞± := lim
λ→∞
xλ± =
γ
2
±
√
γ2
4
− (γ − 1) = γ
2
±
√(γ
2
− 1
)2
(3.16)
Therefore the critical points of g(x) depend on the relative value of γ2 and 1, and we see that
• For γ < 2, then x∞± = γ2±
(
1− γ2
)
, and therefore x∞+ = 1 and x∞− = γ−1. Further, γ−1 < γ2 < 1,
so the point x∞− < argmaxx∈[0,1]G(x) so the interor critical point at steady-state has fewer
cooperators than the (interior) type of group that maximizes the average payoff of group members.
• For γ > 2, x∞± = γ2 ±
(γ
2 − 1
)
and then x∞− = 1 and x∞+ = γ − 1 > 1. Thus the unique critical
point for g(x) is 1 for x ∈ [0, 1].
For λ > 2θγ−1 , we have from (3.13) that f
λ
θ (0) = f
λ
θ (1) = 0. Because 0 and 1 are the only possible
critical points of fλθ (x) other than those of g(x), we can deduce that lim
λ→∞
xˆλ(f
λ
θ ) = γ−1 for 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2
and that lim
λ→∞
xˆλ(f
λ
θ ) = 1 for γ ≥ 1. 
Remark 3.2. For our simplified parameters, γ = 1 corresponds to the point where R = P and our
underlying game is no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma. γ = 2 corresponds to 2R = T + S and is the
cutoff between γ < 2 where average group payoff is maximized at a fraction of cooperators x∗ ∈ (0, 1)
and γ ≥ 2 where average group payoff is maximized all-cooperator groups.
Remark 3.3. An important observation is that xˆλ→∞(fλθ (x)) < argmaxx∈[0,1]G(x) precisely when
γ < 2, meaning that peak abundance in steady-state under weak within-group selection results in fewer
cooperators than in a group with maximal average payoff precisely when average payoff of group members
is maximized by groups with fewer than 100 percent cooperators. When γ ≥ 2, we can think of defectors
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as those that are purely dominant at the within-group level and cooperators are those that are purely
dominant at the between-group level, so relative ratios of within-group and between-group selection
strength between λ = 0 and λ = ∞ neatly interpolate between xˆ0 = 0 and xˆλ→∞ = 1. When groups
with a mix of cooperators and defectors can outperform pure cooperator groups in competition at the
group level, defectors can also be (at least partially) selected for at the between-group level, and the
presence of defectors at steady-state exceeds the level expected by looking at optimal production at the
between-group level alone.
Remark 3.4. Using Equation 3.12, we see that the average payoff of the population satisfies
lim
λ→∞
∫ 1
0
G(x)fλθ (x)dx = lim
λ→∞
γMf1 −Mf2 = γ − 1 = G(1).
This means that the average payoff of the whole population at steady-state achieve the average payoff
of a all-cooperator group when group selection strength λ → ∞ (this is also true when γ ≥ 2 because
limλ→∞ xˆλ = 1). This means that the population cannot, on average, achieve higher payoff than
an all-coopertor group, and illustrates the critical importance of all-cooperator groups for the success
of the whole population. Further, this provides additional illustration of the impossibility to achieve
cooperation at steady-state for any λ when γ = 1, where G(x) = x(1− x) and the only group type with
the same average payoff as the all-cooperator group is the all-defector group.
We illustrate the results of this section in three figures below. In Figure 5, we show, for various γ, the
fraction of cooperators for groups that achieve maximal average payoff and for groups that achieve peak
abundance at steady-state (xˆλ) when the relative strength of group-level selection λ→∞. In Figure 4,
we plot xˆλ for various levels of λ and γ. In Figure 3, we plot the mean fraction of cooperators at steady-
state Mfθ1 and fraction of cooperators in most abundant group type xˆλ for different relative intensities
of selection λ, which highlights the discrepancy between most fit group type and most abundant group
type as λto∞ when γ < 2 and groups are best off with a mix of cooperators and defectors.
Figure 3: The mean fraction of cooperators Mf1 and the fraction of cooperators in the most abudant group
composition for the steady-state xˆλ (as calculated in Equation 3.16) for various values of λ. Other parameters
are fixed as γ = 32 , β = 1, α = 1, so group average payoff is maximized at x
∗ = 34 and peak abundance satisfies
xˆλ → 12 as λ→∞. We note that the mean Mfθ1 is initially larger than xˆλ but also tends to 12 as λ→∞.
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Figure 4: Color indicates the fraction of cooperators in the group type with peak abundance for the steady-
state xˆλ (as calculated in Equation 3.15) for various values of λ and γ. Other parameters are fixed as β = 1 and
α = 1, so group average payoff is maximized at x∗ = min
(
γ
2 , 1
)
and peak abundance satisfies xˆλ → min (γ − 1, 1)
as λ→∞. Vertical slices of heatmap can be interpreted in the same way as the green curve for xˆλ in Figure 3
for a fixed value of γ.
Figure 5: Comparison of the type of group composition x with maximum group reproduction rate G(x) to
the peak abundance for the steady-state xˆλ as λ→∞, plotted in terms of the parameter γ = S + T − 2P . For
γ ≥ 2 both peak group fitness and most abundant group type are all-cooperator groups, while for γ < 2, the
most fit group type γ2 exceeds the most abudant group type at steady-state γ − 1.
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3.2.1 Luo-Mattingly Model
For Case II, corresponding to a scaled version of the frequency independent model governed by Equation
1.1, it was shown by Luo and Mattingly that steady-state solutions take the form f(x) = Z−1f x
λ−θ−1(1−
x)θ−1 [27] for λ > θ > 0. They showed that these steady-states are achieved as the long-time behavior
of Equation 1.1 for initial data with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1. To find the most abundant group
type at steady-state, we compute that f ′(x) = Z−1f [(2− λx) + (λ− θ − 1)]xλ−θ−2(1 − x)θ−2. Then
the three possible global maxima for f(x) are the interior critical point x = λ−θ−1λ−2 = 1− θ−1λ−2 and the
interval endpoints x = 0, 1. We then find that peak abundance is achieved by
argmaxx∈[0,1] f(x) =
{
0 : λ < θ + 1
1− θ−1λ−2 : λ > θ + 1
and see that xˆλ → 1 as λ → ∞, and that xˆλ interpolates between 0 when λ ≤ θ + 1 to 1 as λ → ∞.
Compared to Case I, we see that there is no discrepancy between the most fit group and the most
abundant group type at steady-state in the limit of strong between-group selection (λ → ∞), but
there is also no possibility of having an intermediate group fitness optimum within this family of payoff
matrices.
4 Hawk-Dove
In this section, we consider the multilevel dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game. In Section 4.1, we consider
a special family of payoff matrices which have solvable replicator dynamics, allowing us to apply the
method of characteristics to characterize the long-time behavior of the system. In Section 4.2, we
analyze the steady-states of our multilevel PDE and consider the behavior of steady-states in the limit
of large λ.
4.1 Hawk-Dove Game with Solvable Replicator Dynamics
We consider a special case for HD, where our payoffs satisfy T = R+ 1 and S = P + 1, corresponding
to the parameters β = 1, α = −2. These games are characterized by payoff matrices of the form
C D( )
C γ + P − 2 P + 1
D γ + P − 1 P (4.1)
where, we need γ > 3 for such a payoff matrix to describe an HD game (so that R > S and corespond-
ingly γ+P−2 > P+1). The group average payoff function for this family of games is G(x) = γx−2x2,
which is maximized by groups with a compostion of cooperators of x∗ = min(γ4 , 1). In other words,
groups are best off with γ4 cooperators when 3 < γ < 4, by all-cooperator groups when γ ≥ 4. In the
edge case when γ = 3 and the payoff matrix of Equation 4.1 no longer corresponds to an HD game,
groups have highest average payoff with 34 cooperators. From the payoff matrix, we have that our
multilevel dynamics are given by
∂f(t, x)
∂t
=
∂
∂x
(x(1− x)(2x− 1)f(t, x)) + λf(t, x)
[(
γx− 2x2)− (γMf1 − 2Mf2 )] , (4.2)
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which has characteristic curves satisfying the replicator dynamics
dx(t)
dt
= x(1− x)(1− 2x) (4.3)
which has a stable interior fixed point with a fifty-fifty mix of cooperators and defectors (x = 12), and
has unstable fixed points with full defector (x = 0) and all-cooperator (x = 1) groups. These replicator
dynamics can be solved forwards in time with initial condition x0 as
x(t, x0) = φt(x0) =

1
2
(
1 + (2x0−1)√
(2x0−1)2+(1−(2x0−1)2)et
)
: x0 >
1
2
1
2
(
1− (1−2x0)√
(1−2x0)2+(1−(1−2x0)2)et
)
: x0 <
1
2
(4.4)
and can also be solved backwards in time for initial condition x0 given (t, x(t)) as
x0(t, x(t)) = φ
−1
t (x) =

1
2
(
1 + (2x−1)√
(2x−1)2+(1−(2x−1)2)e−t
)
: x > 12
1
2
(
1− (1−2x)√
(1−2x)2+(1−(1−2x)2)e−t
)
: x < 12
(4.5)
The component of our solution describing solely the effect of between-group competition is
wt(x) = exp
(
λ
(
γ
∫ t
0
x(s, x0)ds− 2
∫ t
0
x(s, x0)
2ds
)
− λ
∫ t
0
h(s)ds
)
(4.6)
where h(s) := γMf1 (s)− 2Mf2 (s). Using the integrals computed in the appendix, we have that
wt(x) =

(√
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t + (2x− 1)
)λ(γ−2)
(2x)λ(γ−2) ((2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t)λ2
eλ(γ−2)t−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)ds : x > 12(√
(1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t + (1− 2x)
)λ(2−γ)
(2x)λ(2−γ) ((1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t)λ2
e−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)ds : x < 12
For a ∈ [0, 12 ], we note that
λ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0
h(s)ds = λ(1−a) [γ − 2(1 + a)]−λγ
∫ t
0
(
Mf1 (s)− a
)
ds+2λ
∫ t
0
(
Mf2 (s)− a2
)
ds (4.7)
where Mf1 (s) − a and Mf2 (s) − a2 measure the deviation of the moments of our distribution f(t, x)
from the moments of δ(x− a). In our subsequent analysis, it is useful to denote
ja(s) := γ
(
Mf1 (s)− a
)
− 2
(
Mf2 (s)− a2
)
.
We isolate the x-dependence by writing wt(x) = k(t)gt(x) with gt(x) given by
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gt(x) =

(√
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t + (2x− 1)
)λ(γ−2)
(2x)λ(γ−2) ((2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t)λ2
: x > 12(√
(1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t + (1− 2x)
)λ(2−γ)
(2x)λ(2−γ) ((1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t)λ2
: x < 12
(4.8)
For the Hawk-Dove game, where there can be groups with fewer cooperators than at the within-group
equilibrium, we define the Hölder exponent describing the behavior near the x = 0 endpoint as
ζ = inf
{
ρ
∣∣∣∣ limx→0 µ0[0, x]xρ > 0
}
To characterize the long-time behavior of the system, we use the following two lemmas. Lemma 4.1
shows us that groups with fewer cooperators than present in the within-group Hawk-Dove equilibrium
at x = 12 are not present in the long-run steady-state. We show that probability of having groups
with fewer cooperators than at the interior Hawk-Dove equilibrium decays to 0 exponentially quickly
as t → ∞. Lemma 4.2 makes a technical point, telling us that∫∞0 ja(s)ds > −∞ for a ∈ [0, 12), which
allows us to simplify our analysis for characterizing when the distribution f(t, x) can converge to a
delta-function at the Hawk-Dove equilibrium δ(x− 12).
For these lemmas, and for the subsequent characterization of the long-time behavior of Equation 4.2,
we will assume that the initial distribution has positive Hölder exponent near ζ > 0 near x = 0, so
there is no initial mass concentrated at all-defector groups. We note that this assumption is made
for convenience, as is allows us to make direct use of the method of characteristics. However, similar
behavior should be expected with initial probably concentrated at all defector groups, as such groups
should lose out to groups with initial nonzero fractions of cooperators due to between-group competition
and groups with initially positive fractions of cooperators are expected to be attracted to the Hawk-
Dove equilibrium at x = 12 due to within-group competition.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose we have an initial distribution µ0 with Hölder exponent ζ > 0 near x = 0. Then
for each δ > 0, lim
t→∞µt[0,
1
2
− δ] = 0.
Proof. From the measure-valued formulation, we write for continuous test-function ψ(x) that∫ 1
2
−δ
0
ψ(x)dµt(x) =
∫ φ−1t ( 12−δ)
0
ψ(φt(x))wt(φ(x))dµ0(x) ≤ ||ψ||∞
∫ φ−1t ( 12−δ)
0
wt(φt(x))dµ0(x)
Because gt(x) is bounded on [0, 12 − δ], there is some M < ∞ such that wt(x) ≤ Me−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)ds, and
thus ∫ 1
2
−δ
0
ψ(x)dµt(x) ≤Me−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[0, φ
−1
t (
1
2 − δ)] ≤Mµ0[0, φ−1t (12 − δ)]
where the last inequality follows because h(s) := γMµ1 − 3Mµ2 ≥ 3(Mµ1 −Mµ2 ) ≥ 0. For sufficiently
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large t, we see from Equation 4.5 and our assumption on µ0[0, x], that
µ0[0, φ
−1
t (x)] ≈
C
2ζ
(
1− (1− 2x)√
(1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t
)ζ
=
C
2ζ
e−ζt
4x(1− x) + et
(
(1− 2x)2 − (1− 2x)√(1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t)
(1− 2x)2 + (1− (1− 2x)2)e−t
ζ
For the term in parenthesis, we see that the numerator is≤ 4x(1−x) and the denominator is ≥ (1−2x)2,
so we have that
µ0[0, φ
−1
t (x)] ≤
C
2ζ
e−ζt (4x(1− x))ζ (1− 2x)−2ζ ≤ Cδ
−2ζ
2ζ
e−ζt
and choosing the test function ψ(x) ≡ 1, we conclude that
µt[0,
1
2 − δ] ≤
CMδ−2ζ
2ζ
e−ζt → 0 as t→∞ 
Lemma 4.2. If µ0[0, x] has Hölder exponent ζ near x = 0, then for a ∈ [0, 12),
∫∞
0 ja(s)ds > −∞.
Proof. We start by writing
ja(s) =
∫ a
0
[
γ (x− a)− 2 (x2 − a2)]µt(dx) + ∫ 1
a
[
γ (x− a)− 2 (x2 − a2)]µt(dx) := j1a(s) + j2a(s)
We denote the intervals I1 = [0, a] and I2 = (a, 1] and correspondingly define p1 =
∫ a
0 µt(dx) and
p2 =
∫ 1
a µt(dx).
First we analyze
∫ 1
a
[
γ (x− a)− 2 (x2 − a2) ( 1p2)]µt(dx). Using the change of variable z = x−a1−a , we can
convert our description of 1p2µt[0, x] as a probability measure on I2 = [a, 1] into a probability measure
νt[0, z] with support on [0, 1]. Because we require normalization when integrating with respect to z,
we desire
1 =
∫ 1
a
1
p2
µt(dx) =
∫ 1
0
1− a
p2
µt(dz) =⇒ νt(dz) := 1− a
p2
µt(dz)
Using this, we can now compute that∫ 1
a
(x− a)
p2
µt(dx) = (1− a)
∫ 1
0
zνt(dz) = (1− a)Mν1
where Mνj :=
∫ 1
0 z
jνt(dz). Similarly, we find that∫ 1
a
(
x2 − a2)
p2
µt(dx) =
∫ 1
0
[
((1− a)z + a)2 − a2
]
νt(dz) = (1− a) [2aMν1 + (1− a)Mν2 ]
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And we can further see that
j2a(s) = p2(1− a)
[
γ
∫ 1
a
(x− a)
p2
µt(dx)− 2
∫ 1
a
(
x2 − a2)
p2
µt(dx)
]
= p2(1− a) [(γ − 4a)Mν1 − 2(1− a)Mν2 ]
= p2(1− a) (γ − 2(1 + a))Mν1 + 2(1− a)(Mν1 −Mν2 ) ≥ 0
where we obtain the final inequality because p2 ≥ 0, a < 12 by assumption, γ ≥ 3 for the Hawk-Dove
game and that Mν1 ≥Mν2 because supp(νt(dz)) ⊆ [0, 1].
Now we can estimate that
j1a = γ
∫ a
0
(x− a)µt(dx)− 2
∫ a
0
(
x2 − a2)µt(dx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≥ −γa
∫ a
0
µt(dx) = −γaµt[0, a]
Because a < 12 , ∃δa > 0 such that a = 12 − δa. Using this and the result of Lemma 4.1, we find that
there are C,M <∞ such that
j1a(s) ≥ −γaµt[0, 12 − δa] ≥ −
CMγaδ−2ζa
2ζ
e−ζt
Combining this with our finding that j2a(s) ≥ 0, we can see that∫ t
0
ja(s)ds =
∫ t
0
(
j1a(s) + j
2
a(s)
)
ds ≥ −
∫ t
0
(
CMγaδ−2ηa
2ζ
e−ζs
)
ds =
CMγaδ−2ζa
ζ2ζ
(
1− e−ζt
)
and therefore we see that
∫ ∞
0
ja(s)ds ≥ −CMγaδ
−2ζ
a
ζ2ζ
> −∞. 
Now we are ready to characterize the long-time behavior of our multilevel Hawk-Dove system in terms
of its initial distribution. The qualitative behavior is divided into two regimes by a critical level of
relative strength of between-group selection (λ∗ := 2θγ−3) which depends on the payoff matrix through
γ and on the initial data through the Hölder exponent θ near x = 1. For λ < λ∗, the distribution
of groups converge to a delta-function at the within-group HD equilibrium (δ(x − 12)) as t → ∞.
When λ > λ∗, the distribution of groups converges as t → ∞ to a density which is supported at all
group types between the within-group HD equilibrium at x = 12 and full-cooperation at x = 1. Notably,
between-group selection can only increase the fraction of cooperators sustained in the group-structured
population at steady-state.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose µ0[0, x] has Hölder exponents ζ near x = 0 and θ near x = 1. Then if
λ(γ − 3) < 2θ, µt(dx) ⇀ δ(x− 12).
Proof. For λ(γ − 3) < 2θ, we show that, for any continuous function ψ(x), ∫ 10 ψ(x)µt(dx) → ψ(12) as
t → ∞. Because φ(·) is continuous, we know that ∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that |φ(x) − φ(12)|<  when
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|x− 12 |< δ. Because µt(dx) is a probability distribution, we can say that∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ(12)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ 12−δ
0
|ψ(x)− ψ(12)|µt(dx) +
∫ 1
2 +δ
1
2−δ
|ψ(x)− ψ(12)|µt(dx) +
∫ 1
1
2 +δ
|ψ(x)− ψ(12)|µt(dx)
≤ + 2||ψ||∞
∫ φ−1t ( 12−δ)
0
wt(φt(x))µ0(dx) + 2||ψ||∞
∫ 1
φ−1t (
1
2 +δ)
wt(φt(x))µ0(dx)
We have that ∃M > 0 such that gt(φt(x)) ≤M for each x ∈ [0, φ−1t (12 − δ)] ∪ [φ−1t (12 + δ), 1], so∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ
(
1
2
) ∣∣∣∣ ≤ + 2M ||ψ||∞e−λ ∫ t0 h(s)dsµt[0, 12 − δ] + 2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−32 )t−∫ t0 h(s)dsµ0[φ−1t (12 + δ), 1]
From Lemma 4.1, we know that 2||ψ||∞e−λ
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµt[0,
1
2 − δ] → 0 as t → ∞. Now we examine
x ∈ [12 + δ, 1]. We see from Equation 4.4 that
φ−1t (x) =
1
2
1 + 1√
1 +
(
1
(2x−1)2 − 1
)
e−t
 ≥ 1− 12

(
1
(2x−1)2 − 1
)
e−t
1 +
(
1
(2x−1)2 − 1
)
e−t
 ≥ 1− 1
2
(
1
(2x− 1)2 − 1
)
e−t
so there exists D > 0 such that for x ∈ [12 + δ, 1],
µ0[φ
−1
t (x), 1] ≤ µ0
[
1−De−t, 1] ≤ CDθe−θt
for sufficiently large t due to our assumption on µ0[1− y, 1] for y near 0. Thus we can write that
2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[φ
−1
t (
1
2 + δ), 1] ≤ 2MCDθ||ψ||∞e[λ(γ−2)−θ]t−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds (4.9)
Because λ2 (γ − 3) < λ(γ − 2), we can separate our analysis into cases where λ(γ − 2) < θ and where
λ
2 (γ − 3) < θ < λ(γ − 2). In the case where λ(γ − 2) < θ, then we use the fact that h(s) :=
γMµ1 − 2Mµ2 ≥ 0 (because γ ≥ 3 for the Hawk-Dove game and because supp (µt(dx)) ⊆ [0, 1]) and
Equation 4.9 to see that
2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[φ
−1
t (
1
2 + δ), 1] ≤ 2MCDθ||ψ||∞e[λ(γ−2)−θ]t → 0 as t→∞ (4.10)
If λ2 (γ − 3) < θ < λ (γ − 2), we use Equation 4.7. BecauseH(a) := (1−a) [γ − 2(1 + a)] is a continuous
and decreasing function of a, our assumption on λ tells us that ∃a∗ ∈ (0, 12) such that λH(a∗) = θ and
λH(a) < θ for a ∈ (a∗, 12 ]. Therefore, for a∗∗ ∈ (a∗, 12 ] we can rewrite Equation 4.9 as
2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[φ
−1
t (
1
2 + δ), 1] ≤ 2MCDθ||ψ||∞e[λH(a
∗∗)−θ]t−∫ t0 ja∗∗ (s)ds
From Lemma 4.2, we know that ∃A <∞ such that ∀t ≥ 0, ∫ t0 ja∗∗(s)ds ≥ −A, so, combined with our
choice of a∗∗ so that λH(a∗∗) < θ, we can deduce that
2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[φ
−1
t (
1
2 + δ), 1] ≤ 2MCDθ||ψ||∞eAe[λH(a
∗∗)−θ]t → 0 as t→∞
Knowing that 2M ||ψ||∞eλ(γ−2)t−
∫ t
0 h(s)dsµ0[φ
−1
t (
1
2 + δ), 1] → 0 as t → ∞ when λ(γ − 3) < 2θ, we can
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combine this with our deduction for µ[0, 12 − δ] from Lemma 4.1 to conclude that∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ψ(x)µt(dx)− ψ(12)
∣∣∣∣ <  as t→∞
and it follows that µt(dx) ⇀ δ(x− 12) as t→∞ when λ(γ − 3) < 2θ. 
Proposition 4.2. Suppose µ0[0, x] has Hölder exponents ζ near x = 0 and θ near x = 1. If λ(γ−3) >
2θ, then
µt(dx)→ f∞(x)dx =
{
Z−1f (2x− 1)λ(γ−3)−2θ−1 (1− x)θ−1x−λ(γ−2)+θ−1dx : x ≥ 12
0 : x < 12
Sample steady-states for given initial distributions with θ = 2 and various values of λ are given in
Figure 6 for payoff matrices with γ = 2.5 (left) and for γ = 1.5 (right). In both panels, we see that the
fraction of cooperators at steady-state increases as λ increases, and we see from the right panel that
even large relative selection strength of between-group selection λ cannot sustain a substantial density
of groups with optimal average payoff.
Figure 6: Steady state densities for various relative selection strengths λ when initial distribution has Hölder
exponent θ = 3 near x = 1, computed from the result of Proposition 4.2. Dotted lines at x = 12 indicates
location of within-group Hawk-Dove equilibrium. (Left) Steady states for games with γ = 4.5 (G(x) maximized
by x = 1). (Right) Steady states for games with γ = 3.5 (G(x) maximized by x = 78 ). Dotted line at x =
7
8 in
right panel indicates maximal group payoff G(x) at that composition x.
Proof. For λ(γ − 3) > 2θ, we demonstrate, for some family of normalizing constants {Zt}t≥0, that
Zt
∫ 1
1
2
[(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)]µt(dx)→
∫ 1
1
2
ψ(x)fθ(x)dx. We first integrate by parts, obtaining∫ 1
1
2
[(ψgt) ◦ φt](x)dµ0(x) = ψgtF0(1−)− ψgtF0(12
+
)−
∫ 1
1
2
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)F0(x)dx
where F0(x) := µ0[0, x] is the cumulative distribution function of µ0. Because φt(x) is continuous and
satisfies φt(12) =
1
2 and φt(1) = 1, we can also say that
∫ 1
0 ∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)] dx = [ψgt](1−)− [ψgt](12
+
).
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This allows us to rewrite our above equation as∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt](x)dµ0(x) = ψgt(1− F0(1−))− ψgt(1− F0(12
+
)) +
∫ 1
0
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt] (x)(1− F (x))dx
We see that 1 − F0(1−) = 0 because supp(µt(dx)) ⊆ [0, 1] and we can use Equation 4.8 to find that
gt(
1
2) = e
−λ(γ−3)2 . Choosing Zt = eθt, we find that
lim
t→∞ e
θt[ψgt(1− F0)](12
+
) = lim
t→∞
(
1− F0(12)
)
ψ(12)e
−(λ(γ−3)
2
−θ)t → 0 when λ(γ − 3) > 2θ
For the integral term, we write y = φt(x) and see that ∂x[ψ(y)gt(y)] = ∂y[ψ(y)gt(y))] · ∂xy, and
integrating with respect to y gives∫ 1
1
2
∂x [(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)] (1− F0(x))dx =
∫ 1
1
2
[∂y (ψgt) ◦ y] (1− F0(φ−1t (y))dy
Because gt(x)→ (2x− 1)λ(γ−3)x−λ(γ−2), limt→∞ ∂x [(ψgt) ◦ x] = ∂x[ (2x− 1)λ(γ−3)x−λ(γ−2)ψ(x) ]. We
also observe that
1− F0(φ−1t (x)) == µ0
[
1− 1
2
(
1− 2x− 1√
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t
)
, 1
]
Then, using our assumption on µ0[1− x, 1] for x near 1 to deduce that for large t,
1− F0(φ−1t (x)) ≈
C
2θ
e−θt
4x(1− x) + et
(
(2x− 1)2 − (2x− 1)√(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t)
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t
θ
We can compute that lim
t→∞ e
θt
[
1− F0(φ−1t (x))
]
= C21−θ (x(1− x))θ (2x− 1)−2θ, and
eθt
∫ 1
1
2
[(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)]µ0(dx)→ C
2θ−1
∫ 1
0
∂x
[
(2x− 1)λ(γ−3)x−λ(γ−2)ψ(x)
]( x(1− x)
(2x− 1)2
)θ
dx
and we can integrate the righthand side by parts to see that
eθt
∫ 1
0
[(ψgt) ◦ φt(x)]µ0(dx)→ θC
2θ−1
∫ 1
0
(2x− 1)λ(γ−3)−2θ−1(1− x)θ−1x−λ(γ−2)+θ−1ψ(x)dx
Using Lemma 4.1, we know that lim
t→∞µt[0, x)→ 0 for x ≤
1
2 , and we can deduce that
µt(dx) ⇀
{
Z−1f (2x− 1)λ(γ−3)−2θ−1(1− x)θ−1x−λ(γ−2)+θ−1dx : x ≥ 12
0 : x < 12

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4.2 Steady States for Hawk-Dove Game
We can find the possible steady-state behaviors for the multilevel Hawk Dove system by characterizing
time-independent solutions of Equation 4.2. We seek to solve the equation
0 =
∂
∂x
(x(1− x)(2x− 1)f(x)) + λf(x)
[
γx− 2x2 − γMf1 + 2Mf2
]
(4.11)
Due to the result of Lemma 4.1, we expect no groups with fewer cooperators than in the within-group
HD equilibrium at x = 12 , so we look for for steady-state densities of the form
f(x) =
{
0 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 12
p(x) : 12 < x ≤ 1
In other words, we look for steady-state densities with support between groups at the HD equilibrium
and all-cooperator groups. Satisfactory densities p(x) are of the form
p(x) = Z−1f x
−λ(γMf1−2Mf2 )−1 (1− x)[λ(γ−2)−λ(γMf1−2Mf2 )]−1 (2x− β)(λ(1−γ)+2λ(γMf1−2Mf2 ))−1
As a test of self-consistency for our steady-state formula, in order for this density to actually correspond
to a probability distribution, we require that the density is integrable. As a result, we need the power
of 1− x to be greater than −1, which is satisfied when
λ(γ − 2)− λ(γMf1 − 2Mf2 ) > 0 =⇒ G(1) >
∫ 1
0
G(x)f∞(x)dx
where we recall that G((1) = γ − 2 and that ∫ 10 G(x)f∞(x)dx = γMf1 − 2Mf2 . Therefore it is im-
possible to have a density steady-state for this Hawk-Dove game for which the average payoff of the
population
∫ 1
0 G(x)f∞(x)dx exceeds the average payoff for members in a all-cooperator group G(1).
Because there are Hawk-Dove games for which G(x) can exceed G(1) (namely, when 3 < γ < 4),
this means that the long-time steady-state cannot fully take advantage of the optimal payoff achieved
by groups with average payoff exceeding all-cooperator groups. To explore this, we aim to compute
xˆλ = argsupx∈[0,1]{(fθ(x)}, the modal group type in the steady-state distribution.
We can parametrize our steady-states by the Hölder exponent θ of p(x) near x = 1, which is related
to the exponent of the (1− x) term by
θ = (γ − 2)λ− λ(γMf1 − 2Mf2 ) =⇒ λ
(
γMf1 − 2Mf2
)
= (γ − 2)λ− θ
allowing us to rewrite our steady-states as
pθ(x) = Z
−1
f x
(2−γ)λ+θ−1 (1− x)θ−1 (2x− 1)λ(γ−3)−2θ−1
We observe that the only steady-state of the multilevel HD PDE with given Hölder exponent θ near
x = 1 agrees with the steady-state shown in Proposition 4.2 to be achieved as the long-time behavior
of Equation 4.2 for initial distributions with the corresponding Hölder exponent. We also note that
such a steady-state is integrable if and only if λ(γ − 3) > 2θ, and that if γ = 3, it is not possible to
have an integrable steady-state of this form, regardless of the value of λ. To determine the fraction of
cooperators x at which the density pθ(x) is maximized, we compute
p′θ(x) = Z
−1
f g(x)x
((2−γ)λ+θ)−2 (1− x)θ−2 (2x− 1)(λ(γ−3)−2θ)−2
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where
g(x) = (γ − 2)λ− θ + 1− [λγ + 4]x+ [2λ+ 6θ]x2
For sufficiently large λ and θ, we know from the above proposition that pθ(β2 ) = pθ(1) = 0, so fθ(x) is
maximized at a root of g(x). These roots are given by
xλ± =
λγ + 4
4λ+ 12
±
√
(λγ + 4)2
4(2λ+ 6)2
− (γ − 2)λ− θ + 1
2λ+ 6
For large λ, we see that
x∞± := lim
λ→∞
xλ± =
γ
4
±
√
γ2
16
− (γ − 2)
2
=
γ
4
±
√(γ
4
− 1
)2
(4.12)
We now break our analysis into two cases:
• If γ > 4, then x∞± = γ4 ±
(γ
4 − 1
)
, so x∞+ =
γ
2 − 1 > 1 and x∞− = 1, so the most abundant group
type in the steady-state fθ(x) has cooperator fraction x approach 1 as λ→∞.
• If γ ≤ 4, then x∞± = γ4 ±
(
1− γ4
)
, so x∞+ = 1 and x∞− =
γ
2 − 1 ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the most
abundant group type in steady-state approaches an intermediate fraction γ2 − 1 as λ→∞.
In the extreme case of the HD game where γ = 3, Equation 4.12 yields x∞− |γ=3= 32 − 1 = 12 . This
tells us that as γ approaches a value at which the density p(x) cannot be integrable, then the most
abundant group type has cooperator composition approaching x∞− |γ=3= 12 even though the most fit
group has x∗ = 34 cooperators, consistent with the prediction from Proposition 4.1 for convergence to
the within-group HD equilibrium δ(x− 12) when γ = 3.
In Figure 7, we illustrate the discrepancy between the most fit group type x∗ and the most abundant
group type at steady-state xˆλ as λ → ∞. The figure shows how fewer cooperators are present than
optimal for group reproduction G(x) at steady-state even in the infinite λ limit when groups are best
off with an intermediate fraction of cooperators x∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 7: Comparison of the type of group composition x with maximum group reproduction rate G(x) to
the peak abundance for the steady-state xˆλ as λ→∞, plotted in terms of the parameter γ = S + T − 2P . For
γ ≥ 4 both peak group fitness and most abundant group type are all-cooperatorx groups, while for γ < 4, the
most fit group type γ4 exceeds the most abundant group type at steady-state
γ
2 − 1.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we considered a model of multilevel selection in which within-group and between-group
competition depend on payoffs from either the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or the Hawk-Dove (HD) game.
We studied a continuous-time stochastic process with explicit individual and group-level replication
events, and derived a nonlocal PDE description of the multilevel system in the limit of large population
size. We studied the steady-state behavior of this PDE, and characterized the critical ratio of relative
selection strength λ between the two levels which separate a regime in which defection dominates in
all groups from a regime in which cooperation and defection can coexist in every group.
In particular, we saw a qualitatively different behavior in two different scenarios: when all-
cooperator groups have maximal average payoff (when “Many hands make light work”) and when
average payoff is maximized by groups with a mix of cooperators and defectors (“Too many cooks spoil
the broth”). In the former case, we showed that defectors are most abundant at steady-state in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma when selection is strongest at the within-group level (λ → 0), while groups with
many cooperators are most abundant at steady-state when selection is strongest at the between-group
level (λ→∞). In the latter case, the effect of within-group selection can be observed for any relative
strength of selection at the two levels, as the mean and modal groups at steady-state feature fewer
cooperators than is optimal for between-group competition. This effect is still felt even in the limit as
between-group competition becomes much stronger than within-group competition (i.e. wG  wI or
λ → ∞). A similar phenomenon is present in the Hawk-Dove game, although the effects of within-
group selection are realized through groups achieving a fraction of cooperators near the mixed-strategy
equilibrium xeq = −βα for the replicator dynamic in a well-mixed population.
This discrepancy between the behavior of this multilevel selection model when group reproductive
success is optimized at an intermediate or extremal cooperator frequency could shed light on questions
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related to the emergence of higher levels of biological organization. For situations in which one type
of individual is purely dominant at a lower level of organization (type-I in Luo’s terminology) and
another type is purely dominant at a higher level of organization (type-G), our analysis has shown
that the long-time distribution of the two types is determined by the relative strength of the two
levels. Further, strong enough selection at the between-group level is sufficient to achieve abundant
cooperation at steady-state when all-cooperator groups have the highest average payoff. However,
when mixed groups are most fit at the between-group level, it turns out that this form of deterministic
multilevel selection is not sufficient to achieve the emergence of optimal group average payoff at steady-
state, and the multilevel system can never eliminate the ghost of lower-level selection. As such, problems
with intermediate group payoff optima are not as simple to solve. In the extreme case of group payoff
function G(x) = x(1−x) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, no cooperation could ever succeed for any relative
selection strength at the two levels, and so alternative mechanisms are necessary to achieve emergence
of cooperation in such scenarios.
The threshold criteria in Propositions 3.2 and 4.2 for the level of relative between-group selection
strength λ needed to exhibit long-time cooperation highlight the key importance of all-cooperator
groups in sustaining cooperative outcomes for the whole metapopulation. These criteria also provide
some analytical support for the numerical intuition provided by Markvoort et al [14] for the necessity
of initial all-cooperator groups to promote evolutionary coexistence of cooperators and defectors. The
success of all-cooperator groups also plays an important role in Traulsen-Nowak stochastic model of
multilevel selection [23], in which there is a separation of time scales such that selection of cooperators
or defectors within groups acts much faster than selection between groups. That this effect appears
even in the continuum limit and in cases where either within-group selection or between-group selection
most favors a mix of cooperators and defectors indicates that the success of all-cooperator groups is
truly necessary for the viability of the whole population.
In this paper, we have primarily focused on one family of Prisoner’s Dilemmas and one family of
Hawk Dove games. For these families, the solvability of the within-group replicator dynamics allowed us
to use the method of characteristics to fully characterize the long-time behavior of the corresponding
special cases of Equation 2.5, and helped to provide insight into the properties of the steady-state
behavior as λ ranges from 0 to ∞. However, it is interesting to wonder how general these results
are, particularly as to whether one can similarly characterize the asymptotic behavior of Equation 2.5
without solvable characteristic curves, and whether there is a similar discrepancy in qualitative behavior
when group payoff G(x) is maximized by all-cooperator groups and when groups are best off with a
mix of cooperators and defectors. In addition, one could explore the breadth of biological phenomena
that have as a natural description a competition between the effects at two levels of selection.
Given the gap in cooperation displayed by the mean and modal groups at steady-state relative
to intermediate group-level optima even for strong between-group competition, another problem which
arises is how even higher levels of selection could emerge if the effects of the lowest level of selection
can never be forgotten. Is there a way to overcome this ghost of lower level selection? Perhaps the
conflict between the two initial levels of selection must be resolved through an alternative mechanism
which eliminates the misalignment of incentives at the two levels. Pruitt et al have observed that
individual-level regulation of birth rates of cheaters and cooperators can stabilize optimal trait fractions
in nest-structured spider populations [52, 53], while Haig has suggested mechanisms for intracellular
and intercellular selection which allow mitochondrial DNA to prevent the uncontrolled replication that
diminishes cellular function [54]. Aktipis et al characterize five mechanisms by which organisms can
maintain healthy ratios of somatic cells, and demonstrate that the failure of such mechanisms and
the dominance of “defector” cells constitute the onset of cancer [55]. With these examples in mind, a
natural future direction for our multilevel selection model is to explore the potential mechanisms by
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which groups can overcome this ghost of lower level selection and potentially evolve towards higher
levels of biological complexity.
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A Integrals for Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this section, we will use the solutions to Equation 3.1, the replicator dynamics for the special
PD from Section 3.1, in order to express the solution of Equation 3.4 along characteristics in terms
of the integrals
∫ t
0 x(x0, s)ds and
∫ t
0 x(x0, s)
2ds . We use the formulas for both the forward solution
x(t, x0) = φt(x0) given by Equation 3.2 and the backward solution φ−1t (x) = x0(t, x) given by Equation
3.3.
The easier integral for us to compute is
∫ t
0
x(s)2ds =
∫ t
0
ds
e−2s
(
1
x20
− 1
)
+ 1
=
1
2
∫ e2t
1
du
u
(
u
(
1
x20
− 1
)
+ 1
) = 1
2
∫ e2t
1
1
u
+
(
1
x20
− 1
)
u
(
1
x20
− 1
)
+ 1
 du
=
1
2
(
log(u) + log
((
1
x20
− 1
)
u+ 1
)) ∣∣∣∣e2t
1
= t+
1
2
log
(
(1− x20)e2t + x20
)
Then, plugging in for x20 =
[(
1
x2
− 1) e−2t + 1]−1 gives us that∫ t
0
x(s)2ds = t+
1
2
log
((
1−
(
1
x2
− 1
))
e2t +
(
1
x2
− 1
))
= t− 1
2
log
(
e−2t
(
1− x2)+ x2) (A.1)
The more involved integral is
∫ t
0
x(s)ds =
∫ t
0
ds√
e−2s
(
1
x20
− 1
)
+ 1
=
1
2
∫ e2t( 1
x20
−1
)
+1
1
x20
du
(u− 1)u1/2
where u = e2s
(
1
x20
− 1
)
+ 1. Partial fraction decomposition gives us
∫ t
0
x(s)ds =
1
4
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+1
1
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Using x20 =
1
e−2t
(
1
x2
−1
)
+1
, we see that 1−
√
e2t
(
1
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− 1
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+ 1 = 1 + 1x and −1 +
√
e2t
(
1
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1− 1x , and we can deduce that∫ t
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39
Again using the definition of x0 we see that
(1 + x0)
2
1− x20
=

(√
e−2t
(
1
x2
− 1)+ 1 + 1)2
e−2t
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1
x2
− 1)+ 1
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 (A.2)
B Integrals for Hawk-Dove
In this section, we will use the solutions to Equation 4.3, the replicator dynamics for the special
PD from Section 4.1, in order to express the solution of Equation 4.2 along characteristics in terms
of the integrals
∫ t
0 x(x0, s)ds and
∫ t
0 x(x0, s)
2ds . We use the formulas for both the forward solution
x(t, x0) = φt(x0) given by Equation 4.4 and the backward solution φ−1t (x) = x0(t, x) given by Equation
4.5.
B.1 x(t), x0 > 12
Here we compute
∫ t
0
x(s)ds for x(t), x0 > 12 . Making the substitution p = 2x0 − 1 > 0, we have
∫ t
0
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∫ t
0
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Now we can write p = 2x0 − 1 as a function of x to write our integral in terms of x. We have that
p2 = (2x0− 1)2 = (2x− 1)
2
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t =⇒ p
2 + (1− p2)et = 1
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t
and we can compute that√
p2 + (1− p2)et − p√
p2 + (1− p2)et + p =
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1− (2x− 1)√
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)
=
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x
We can also find that
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
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)2
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
and we can use the two equations above to find that∫ t
0
x(s)ds = t+ log
(√
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t + (2x− 1)
2x
)
(B.1)
Next we would like to integrate x(s)2, which we can see that
∫ t
0
x(s)2ds =
1
4
∫ t
0
(
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p√
p2 + (1− p2)es
)2
ds
=
t
4
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2
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0
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For the last term, we see that
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4
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1
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t+ log
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Putting all of this together, we find that
∫ t
0
x(s)2ds = t+ log
(√
(2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t + (2x− 1)
2x ((2x− 1)2 + (1− (2x− 1)2)e−t)−1/4
)
(B.2)
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B.2 x(s), x0 < 12
For x(s) < 12 (and correspondingly x0 <
1
2), we have that
x(s) =
1
2
(
1− 1− 2x0√
(1− 2x0)2 + (1− (1− 2x0)2e−t
)
=
1
2
(
1− q√
q2 + (1− q2)e−t
)
where q = 1− 2x0 > 0 when x0 < 12 . Then we can the integrals computed above to see that∫ t
0
x(s)ds =
1
2
∫ t
0
(
1− q√
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)
ds
=
t
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− p
2
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+ log
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= − log
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Similarly, we can compute∫ t
0
x(s)2ds =
1
4
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+ log
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log
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1
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log
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2x
)
In particular, we observe that our expressions for
∫ t
0 x(s)ds and
∫ t
0 x(s)
2ds do not have any linear
factors of t when x(s) < 12 , which are notably present in our expressions when x(s) >
1
2 . We can use
this to show how the probability of group compositions below the Hawk-Dove equilibrium vanishes as
t→∞.
C Preservation of Hölder exponent near x = 1
In this section, we study how the Hölder exponent of the population state f(t, x) evolves in time.
Using analytically-solvable special cases of Equation 2.5 with illustrative choices of initial data, we
demonstrate examples in which the Hölder exponent of the distribution of cooperators near x = 1 is
preserved by the dynamics of our multilevel system. A proof that the Hölder exponent near x = 1 is
preserved for solutions to more general cases to Equation 2.5 will be presented in future work.
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C.1 Frequency Independent (Luo-Mattingly) Case
For the frequency independent model, described by Equation 1.1, we can use the reasoning of Example
3.2 and the exact solution for uniform initial data given by Luo and Mattingly [27] to calculate exact
solutions for our choice of initial data. For density-valued initial data of the form f(0, x) = θ(1−x)θ−1,
we see that Equation 1.1 has density-valued solutions given by
fθ(t, x) =
θ(λ− 1) (1− e−t)
1− e−(λ−1)t
[
(1− x) e−t + x]λ−θ−1 (1− x)θ−1 e−(θ−1)t (C.1)
Then we use L’Hôpital’s rule to see that
lim
x→0
∫ 1
1−x
fθ(t, x)
xΘ
= lim
x→0
fθ(t, 1− x)
ΘxΘ−1
=
θ
Θ
[
lim
x→0
xθ−Θ
] [
lim
x→0
(
(λ− 1)e−(θ−1)t (1− e−t)
1− e−(λ−1)t
[
xe−t + (1− x)]λ−θ−1)]
Further noting that
lim
x→0
(
(λ− 1)e−(θ−1)t (1− e−t)
1− e−(λ−1)t
[
xe−t + (1− x)]λ−θ−1) = (λ− 1)e−(θ−1)t (1− e−t)
1− e−(λ−1)t := K > 0
Then we can see that
lim
x→0
∫ 1
1−x
fθ(t, x)
xΘ
=

0 : Θ < θ
K : Θ = θ
∞ : Θ > θ
so we can deduce that the Hölder exponent of the measure fθ(t, x)dx with corresponding density fθ(t, x)
is equal to θ for all times t ≥ 0. Thus, for the family of initial conditions f0(x) = θ(1 − x)θ−1 (with
initial Hölder exponent θ), the Hölder exponent for the population near x = 1 is preserved in time.
C.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma with β = −1, α = −1
We now consider the special family of Prisoner’s Dilemmas whose behavior is the subject of Section
3.1. Recalling Equation 3.9, we have that
f(t, x) = θZ−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]tgt(x)
((
1− x2)+ e2t (x2 − x√e−2t (1− x2) + x2))θ−1 (e−2t(1− x2) + x2)1−θ
We can then compute that
lim
x→0
[∫ 1
1−x f(t, y)dy
xΘ
]
= lim
x→0
f(t, 1− x)
ΘxΘ−1
=
θ
Θ
Z−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]t lim
x→0
[
1
xΘ−1
gt(1− x)
(
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2)1−θ (A(x, t))θ−1]
(C.2)
where A(x, t) :=
(
2x− x2) + e2t ((1− x)2 − (1− x)√e−2t (2x− x2) + (1− x)2). To simplify the ex-
pression in Equation C.2, we first note that limx→0
[
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2]1−θ = 1. Further, recall-
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ing Equation 3.7, we have that
gt(1−x) =
(
xe−2t
2− x +
2(1− x)2 + 2(1− x)√e−2t (2x− x2) + (1− x)2
(2− x)2
)λγ
2 (
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2)−λ2
(C.3)
and we see that limx→0 gt(1− x) = 1. This allows us to say that
lim
x→0
[∫ 1
1−x f(t, y)dy
xΘ
]
=
θ
Θ
Z−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]t lim
x→0
[
(A(x, t))θ−1
xΘ−1
]
=
θ
Θ
Z−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]t
(
lim
x→0
[
A(x, t)
x
])θ−1
lim
x→0
[
xθ−Θ
]
Then we see that
lim
x→0
A(x)
x
= lim
x→0
[
2x− x2
x
+
e2t
x
(
(1− x)2 − (1− x)
√
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2
)]
= 2 + e2t lim
x→0
[
−2(1− x) +
√
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2 − (1− x)2 e
−2t − 1√
e−2t(2x− x2) + (1− x)2
]
= 1
and therefore we see that
lim
x→0
∫ 1
1−x
f(t, y)dy
xΘ
=

0 : Θ < θ
Z−1f e
[λ(γ−1)−2θ]t : Θ = θ
∞ : Θ > θ
and so we see that the Hölder exponent of f(t, x) near x = 1 agrees with the Hölder exponent of the
initial distribution when initial distributions are chosen to have the form θ(1− x)θ−1.
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